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ARTICLE

"Protection and Empire": The Martens Clause,
State Sovereignty, and Individual Rights
JEFFREY

KAHN

The Martens Clause was a last-minute compromise that saved the 1899 Hague
Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land. In its original
formulation, the clause shielded individuals under "the protection and empire" of
internationallaw, prinmples of humanit, and the dictates of the public conscience. E
E Martens, its author, was Russia greatest international law scholar and an
extraordinary dplomat. He saw no applicationfor his work in the nineteenth-century
internalaffairs of states, notwithstandingthe transnationalterrorism thatplagued (and
ultimately destroyed) the Russian Empire. Martens t worldview is no longer our own.
State sovereignty is no longer an absolute value in public internationallaw, in part
because of the well-known human rights revolution of the twentieth century. As a
result, the reach and importance of the Martens Clause has grown. This history helps
refute the claim that internationalhumanitarianlaw is ill-suitedfor twenty-first century
transnationalterrorism. But the Clause is not, and never was, a panacea.

* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. B.A. 1994, Yale;
M.Phil. 1996, Oxford; D.Phil. 1999, Oxford; J.D. 2002, Michigan. This Article is based on remarks
made at the Major General John L. Fugh Symposium on Law and Military Operations, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, May 14, 2014. A draft was completed while a
visiting professor at the Washington & Lee School of Law. I thank Washington & Lee for such an
excellent environment to read, think, and write, and the staff of the Virginia Journal of International
Law for their five-star editorial work. I also thank Professor Bobby Chesney and Brigadier General
Richard Gross, with whom I shared the Fugh Symposium panel, and Geoff Corn, Mark Drumbl,
Chris Jenks, Rene Provost, and Ken Watkin for their helpful comments. I remain wholly responsible
for the contents of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION

Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity,
and the requirements of the public conscience.
- The Martens Clause (1899)'

In May 2014, a symposium at the U.S. Army's Judge Advocate General's
Legal Center and School opened with a question: "Is the use of force
against al-Qaeda and associated forces, globally, justified in the context of
a continuing transnational armed conflict?" 2 If justified, the symposium
organizers asked, what law governs this so-called transnational armed
conflict? Virtually the same questions occupied experts at the Hague in a
conference sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) in June 2003.3
More than a decade after the start of what then-President George W
Bush called the "war on terror," it may seem strange that these jus ad bellum
and jus in bello questions remain unresolved. Their answers, however, turn
1. Preamble to Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, reprinted in TEXTS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCES AT THE HAGUE, 1899 AND 1907, at 48

(James Brown Scott ed., 1908).
2. Program, Major General John L. Fugh Symposium on Law and Military Operations, U.S. Army
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (May 14, 2014) (on file with author).
3. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEHEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 31 (2003) [hereinafter ICRC 28TH

CONFERENCE REPORT ("The debate focused on whether the use of force against transnational
non-state actors could qualify as armed conflict (international or non-international).").

2016]

PROTECTION AND EMPIRE

3

out to be devilishly complicated. With whom is the United States fighting?
What international legal status does this adversary (or these adversaries)
possess? Under what body of law should its fighters be held accountable?
What legal duties correspond to the law authorizing a state to fight an
entity that, whatever else it may be, is not a sovereign nation-state?
Behind these questions lies an unstated and often unquestioned
assumption that these are new questions raised by a new century's
problems. Indeed, as detailed below, President Bush's response to the
attacks of September 11, 2001, was premised on the conviction that
existing international law did not contemplate and could not adequately
respond to the novelty of the terrorist threat confronting the United
States. Perhaps to a lesser extent, President Barack Obama has also
accepted this assumption.
I challenge that assumption. Transnational terrorism is not a new
problem. Puzzling about which law governs a state's response to organized
force by non-state actors does not ask a new question. The novelty
premise is not only false, it is a dangerous starting point for discussion of
the applicability of international humanitarian law (also known as the law
of armed conflict or the laws of war). Claiming newness where it does not
exist diminishes the power of this body of law to achieve its twin goals: to
limit armed conflicts to their shortest duration and fewest casualties. The
assertion that we are at the cusp of what Hersch Lauterpacht called "the
vanishing point of international law" 4-that there is no applicable law to
apply - is one step away from the hoary claim that law is silent in wartime
(interarma silent leges).
Although I argue that "[w]hat has been will be again," I do not claim
that "there is nothing new under the sun." 5 What is new is the changed
relationship between state sovereignty and individual (human) rights, a
change that affects how a state may lawfully confront a non-state actor in
an armed conflict. 6 Traditionally, states enjoyed absolute sovereignty and

human beings were not subjects of international law. This view was
radically altered by the twentieth century's experience of total warfare. No
twenty-first century state possesses what nineteenth-century statesmen or
international lawyers would recognize as absolute sovereignty. At the same
time, individuals have acquired increasing rights as subjects (not merely
4. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 360,
382 (1952) ("If international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is,
perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law").
5. Ecclesiastes 1:9 (New International Version).
6. The terminology is not important. Individual rights is used here to avoid confusion about
substantive claims concerning human rights law. I mean only to distinguish between a focus on states
versus a focus on individuals, without implying a position about the origin, scope, or content of
those rights.
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objects) of international law. In other words, this novelty cuts in the
opposite direction from the laisseZjaire claims to unregulated warfare that
so appealed to President Bush's legal advisors, and which continue to nag
at the edges of President Obama's counter-terrorism policies.
This Article develops these claims of continuity and change by
examining the Martens Clause to the 1899 Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Clause takes its name from
Friedrich Fromhold von Martens (also known as Fyodor Fyodorovich
Martens), the Russian Empire's extraordinary diplomat and international
lawyer. Jean Pictet, the "main architect" 7 of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, referred to the Clause as "the fruit of the genius of Friedrich von
Martens." 8 Its author was a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize9 and the
recipient of honorary degrees from Cambridge, Edinburgh, Oxford, and
Yale.' 0 The ICRC summarized the power of this short provision:
[T]he Martens clause, which itself applies independently of
participation.in the treaties containing it, states that the principles
of international law apply in all armed conflicts, whether or not a
particular case is provided for by treaty law, and whether or not the
relevant treaty law binds as such the Parties to the conflict."
This is not what the Martens Clause meant to Martens. In its author's
day, Europe (especially Russia) confronted a surge of transnational
terrorism that by every measure overshadowed the terrorism that darkened
the start of our current century. Originally, the Martens Clause offered no
protection whatsoever for these transnational terrorists. This was so even
though the Clause sought to close the gaps to be found in the law of war
by applying "principles of international law,

. .

. the laws of humanity, and

the requirements of the public conscience" when treaty law seemed absent
7. Press Release, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Henry Dunant Medals Awarded at Red Cross
Red
Crescent
Council
of
Delegates
(Nov.
17,
2005),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2009-and-earlier/council-delegatesnews-171105.htm.
8. JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

60 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985).
9. Lauri Millksoo, Friedrich Fromhold von Martens (Fodor.FodorovichMartens) (1845-1909), in THE
&

OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OFINTERNATIONA.. LAW 1147, 1149 (Bardo Fassbender

Anne Peters eds., 2012).
10. VLADIMIR VASIL'EVICH PUSTOGAROV, OUR MARTENS: EE MARTENS, INTERNATIONAL
LAWYER AND ARCHITECT OF PEACE 46 (William Elliott Butler ed., trans., 2000) [hereinafter
PUSTOGAROV, OUR MARTENS]. This may be the only biography written about Martens, perhaps due
in part to the disappearance of his extensive diaries, which were kept in Soviet archives and were
inaccessible until late in the perestroika period. Id. at ix-x (describing Butler's access to the diaries).
11 . Bruno Zimmermann, Commentary to Article I, Protocol 1, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8JUNE 1977TOTHE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at
39 (1 56) (Yves Sandoz et al., eds., ICRC 1987).
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or inapplicable.1 2 As will be discussed below, Martens's view of his Clause's
applicability, although enlightened and innovative in 1899, reflected the
core assumptions of his day about sovereignty.
As one scholar observed, "[t]here is no denying that the way
international relations were to develop in the decades following Martens'
demise varied in many respects from the way Martens had anticipated or
hoped for." 1 3 What changed? The relationship between individual rights
and state sovereignty. The transformation of that relationship informs the
answer to the questions that began this Article, even if it does not fully
answer them.
Candor about the lack of conclusive answers reflects that this Article is
also about the limits to the Martens Clause. The Clause has been the
subject of a recent surge of interest as a source of argument in debates
about new means and methods of warfare, such as cyber attacks and
autonomous weapons systems. 14 The history of the Martens Clause is
generally omitted from these position papers. That history reminds us that
the purpose of the clause was not to end debate, but to forestall the worst
consequences for civilian populations and belligerents that would result if
the parties assumed that a lack of tight-fitting treaty law meant carte blanche
freedom to act, unconstrained by any law. The Martens Clause changed the
baseline for such cases from one in which the parties perceived no
obligations under international humanitarian law to one in which
international humanitarian law could provide at least some basic
protections. The Martens Clause moved the starting point for discussion
from zero to some positive integer. That is sufficient cause for its
continued celebration.
That baseline number has grown larger over the past century as state
sovereignty has changed from an absolute to a relative value, as armed
conflicts have increasingly involved non-state actors, and as international
human rights law recast the individual as a subject of international law.
States are no longer absolute sovereigns; international law demands respect
for certain fundamental individual rights regardless of a sovereign's desire
vel non to protect them. The emergence of a theory of one state's
"responsibility to protect" individual rights against violation within another
12. Scott, supra note 1, at 48.
13. Arthur Eyffinger, FriedrichMartens:A Founding Fatherof the Hague Tradition (The Fourth Friedrich
Martens Memorial lecture), in 15 ESTONIAN NAT'L DEF. COL. PROC. 16 (Rain Liivoja and Andres
Saurnets, eds., 2012), available at http://www.ksk.edu.ee/en/re-search/endc-proceedings-nr-15/.
14. See, e.g., Erki Kodar, Applying the Law of Armed Conkt to CyberAttacks: From the Martens Clause
to Additional Protocol I, in 15 ESTONIAN NAT'L DEF. COLL. PROC. supra note 13, at 107; BONNIE
DOCHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & HARVARD INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, LOSING
HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 24-26, 35-36 (2012) (explaining article and the
topic it discusses).
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state points to the distance traveled from traditional views of sovereignty's
empire.' 5
Indeed, if, as many argue, international human rights law is available and
applicable at all times to protect all individuals, what present utility remains
for the Martens Clause? 16 It was intended as a filler of gaps in the law of
armed conflict. Is there now any gap for which some body of international
law, human rights or humanitarian, is not already available?
I seek to capture the change worked on this relationship with the
peculiar phrase in the original Martens Clause from which this Article
takes its title: civilians and belligerents live under a certain "protection and
empire." In the twenty-first century, if not the nineteenth, this odd pairing
emphasizes the century-long transformation of the relationship in
international law between the recognition of human rights (protection)
and the remaining privileges of state sovereignty (empire). The Martens
Clause reflects a law of armed conflict that today demands both rights and
duties of states fighting transnational non-state actors. These are rights
and duties from which states cannot opt out by asserting that some aspect
of an armed conflict is unprecedented or novel, or by claiming absolute
sovereignty to act in the perceived interstices of incomplete treaty law
from an earlier era.
In this way, the Martens Clause still has an important role to play, albeit
in a world in which claims of absolute sovereignty have been pierced by a
growing body of law that protects individuals regardless of the will of the
state in which they reside. The broadly framed Martens Clause continues
to be not only "an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of
military technology," as the International Court of Justice observed, but
also a constant reminder of the evolving nature of armed struggles more
generally.'? The Martens Clause also continues to stand for the proposition
15. Oona Hathaway, et al., Consent-BasedHumanitarianIntervention: Giving Soreign Responsibiity Back

to the Soveregn, 46 CORNELL INT'l. L.J. 499,529 (2013).
16. See, e.g., Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, InternationalLega Protection of Human

Rights in Armed Conflict, 5-6, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01 (2011) ("Indeed, it is widely recognized
nowadays by the international community that since human rights obligations derive from the
recognition of inherent rights of all human beings and that these rights could be affected both in
times of peace and in times of war, international human rights law continues to apply in situations of
armed conflict. Moreover, nothing in human rights treaties indicates that they would not be
applicable in times of armed conflict."). But see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in

the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,

l 106 (uly

9) ("As regards the

relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three
possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others
may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of
international law.").

17. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
T 78 (Jul. 8).
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that, although the development of new law tends to lag behind such
change in the nature of armed conflict, that fact does not present the state
a non liquet to exploit against its adversary.
Part I of this Article recounts the very anti-Martens Clause position that
the United States embraced by asserting the novelty of a post-9/11 world.
Part II rejects this assertion with an exploration of the transnational
terrorism that besieged Europe and particularly the Russian Empire at the
turn of the nineteenth century. Part III then provides a history of the
Martens Clause, formulated at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference (which
met, incidentally, at the suggestion of the Russian Czar). Part IV explains
how the Martens Clause has changed from its origins, as a provision of
international law that even its author considered irrelevant in the Russian
Empire's fight with terrorists, to its present status as a provision that is
inescapable wherever a sovereign state asserts itself to be fighting a
transnational armed conflict with non-state actors.

1. THE UNITED

STATES AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

On September 20, 2001, President George W Bush informed a joint
session of Congress that the attacks of September 11th were "an act of
war against our country."18 But the President asserted that the "war on
terror"-his first use of this term-was different from past wars.19 His
words resonated with earlier comments on the South Lawn of the White
House, when the President had remarked on the novelty "of this conduct
of this war against terrorism," saying: "This is a new kind of-a new kind
of evil." 20
This was not mere rhetoric. In a memo to the President four months
later, then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales acknowledged that
"[als you have said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war."
Gonzales concluded that "this new paradigm renders obsolete" some
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, while others were now "quaint." 21
18. President George W Bush, Address to a joint Session of the 107th Congress (Sept. 20, 2001),
available
at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected-SpeechesGeorgeWBush.pdf.
19. Id.
20. President George W Bush, Remarks Upon Arrival at the South Lawn of the White House
(Sept. 16, 2001), available at bttp://georgewbush-whitchouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010916-2.html. This theme concluded the remarks as well: "That's why I say to the
American people we've never seen this kind of evil before. But the evil-doers have never seen the
American people in action before, either - and they're about to find out." Id.
21. Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales to President George W Bush,
Discussion re: Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf. Four years later, President Bush declared that provisions of
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The reason was that "this is a new type of warfare-one not contemplated
in 1949 when the GPW [Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War] was framed-and requires a new approach in our
actions towards captured terrorists." 22

In fact, the administration's view of the inapplicability of the Geneva
Conventions extended much further than a few of its provisions.
Administration officials argued that the Geneva Conventions applied only
to instances of armed conflict between nation-states or, with much more
limited effect, to conflicts within a state fought between that state and
non-state insurgents or rebels. 23 Since the conflict between the United
States and al-Qaeda fit neither description, no governing legal regime was
triggered by the American use of force (although, it was claimed,
international law permitted the use of force in response to al-Qaeda's
attacks).24 President Bush therefore concluded that "[a]s a matter of
policy"-not as a matter of law-the United States would treat detainees
humanely and, "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." 25
The limitation "consistent with military necessity" effectively rendered
the otherwise generous policy of broad compliance with international
humanitarian law null and void. The point of the Geneva Conventions was
to provide certain rights that were not subject to easy derogation on
grounds of necessity or otherwise. But America claimed to be fighting
something new to public international law. Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions were "vague and undefined." George W Bush,
Address on the Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists (September 6, 2006),
available at http://georgewbush-whitchousc.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/SelectedSpeechesGeorge-WBush.pdf.
22. Gonzales, supra note 21, at 3.
23. Memorandum from George W Bush to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Chief of State to the President, the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of
the joint Chiefs of Staff, Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002),
available at http://wwv.pegc.us/archive/WhiteHouse/bush_memo_20020207_ed.pdf.
24. Id. ("I determine that the Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants and, therefore, do not
qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of Geneva. I note that, because Geneva does not apply to
our conflict with al Qaeda, al Qaeda detainees also do not qualify as prisoners of war."); see also Brief

for Respondents at 48, Hramdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) ("As the President
determined, because the conflict between the United States and al Qaeda has taken place and is
ongoing in several countries, the conflict is 'of an international character,' and Article 3 is thus

inapplicable.").
25. Memorandum from George W Bush to the Vice President, et al. supra note 23, at T 3. Perhaps
implicit in this discussion of the applicability of international humanitarian law to such conflicts is
the problem of reciprocity. For an excellent discussion of the issue with special regard to
contemporary conflicts with non-state actors, see Rene Provost, Asymmetrical Reerocity and Compliance
with the laws of War, in MODERN WARFARE: ARMED GROUPS, PRIVATE MILITARIES,
HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE LAW 17, 17-42 (Benjamin Perrin ed., 2012).
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were "unlawful combatants" in a global "war on terrorism" that did not fit
within the conventional categories of armed conflicts. 26 According to the

United States Government, such a war could be fought free of any
constraints imposed by the Geneva Conventions. 27
The ICRC rejected this approach, just as it rejected this terminology.28
The ICRC argued that a case-by-case assessment of violence around the
globe would lead to one of three classifications. 29 The first and clearest
case in which the Geneva Conventions applied was an armed conflict of

26. Although the terms "unlawful combatant" and "enemy combatant" were not new, ree
Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Bellgerents, and the Struggle Over
Legitimacy, 2 PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL'Y AND CONFLICT RES., HARV. UNIV., OCCASIONAL
PAPER
SERIES
5
n.10,
65
(2005),
available
at
http://wwwhpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/OccasionalPaper2.pdf;
the concept of
a "global war on terror," or "GWOT" in Pentagon patois, was new to this discussion. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 2310.01E, ENCLOSURE 2 (Sept. 5, 2006), in INT'L AND OPERATIONAL
LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 407 (Wm. J. Johnson, ed., 2013), available at
http://wwwloc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/LOAC-Documentary-Supplement-2013.pdf
("Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts
against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during
an armed conflict. For purposes of the war on terrorism, the term Unlawful Enemy Combatant is
defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or
al-Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners.").
27. Even rights previously accepted as reflective of customary international law, such as the
"fundamental guarantees" of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I were subject to reinterpretation. See
Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rigbts and Humanitarian Iaw in the War on Terror: Comparing
Hamdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 373, 387 (2007) (noting that
although two previous U.S. State Department Legal Advisors had confirmed its customary
international law status, "the current US administration has regrettably cast even this point into
doubt, and its present Legal Adviser has stated that the administration is 'looking at' whether Article
75 guarantees are applicable in the 'war on terror'.").
28. Gabor Rona, Legal Adviser, Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Presentation at Workshop on the
Protection of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism: When is a War Not a War? The Proper
Role of the Law of Armed Conflict in the "Global War on Terror"(Mar. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/5xcmnj.htm ("The phrase 'war on terror'
is a rhetorical device having no legal significance."); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 301C/07/8.4,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGFS OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED
CONFLICTS: REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 30TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED
CROSS AND RED CRESCENT 8 (2007) [hereinafter ICRC 30TH CONFERENCE REPORT] available at
https://wwwicrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ihl-challenges-30th-international-conference-eng.pdf
(describing IHL concerning status of persons and observing "IHL treaties contain no explicit
reference to 'unlawful combatants."'); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 31IC/11/5.1.2,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED
CONFLICTS: REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 31sT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED
CROSS AND RED CRESCENT 10 (2011) [hereinafter ICRC 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT],
https://vww.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-internationalconference/31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf ("It should be reiterated that the
ICRC does not share the view that a conflict of global dimensions is or has been taking place.").
29. ICRC 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 7-11.
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any intensity between two states (a "Common Article 2" conflict, so
named for the identically numbered articles of all four Geneva
Conventions). 30 In the second place, international humanitarian law also
applied in more limited fashion to conflicts "not of an international
character" (i.e. a "Common Article 3" conflict) if the parties were
sufficiently organized and the violence between them had reached a
sufficient level of intensity.3 1 If, thirdly, either the criteria of organization
or intensity were not met, that did not mean that an unregulated armed
conflict was permitted. Rather, an armed conflict simply could not be said
to occur. In such a case, neither party could invoke the authorities or claim
the protection of the law of armed conflict. Instead, domestic law and
international human right law applied to any use of force. In any event, the
ICRC insisted that this treaty-based nomenclature should not obscure the
fact that considerable customary international humanitarian law applied to
armed conflict regardless of its inter-state nature. 32 As a matter of law, the
ICRC observed, "there can be no wars in which one side has all the rights
and the other has none." 33
The Supreme Court of the United States also rejected the Bush
Administration's view. 34 But the Court's decision came five years after the
government operationalized its original legal position. The interim result,
as Geoff Corn observed, was that the legal framework that had long
30. Article 2 of each of the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Common Article 3)
states "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of them." Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UN.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II7]; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV]. As the official commentary makes clear, "It makes no difference how long
the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The respect due to the human person as such is
not measured by the number of victims." INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: IV
GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR
20-21 (Jean S. Picetet ed., 1958).
31. Article 3 of each of the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 states that "[in the
case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions." Geneva Convention I, supra note 30, at art. 3; Geneva Convention II, supra note 30, at
art. 3; Geneva Convention 111, supra note 30, at art. 3; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 30, at art. 3.
32. ICRC 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 12 ("As a matter of customary law, the
basic IHL principles and rules governing the conduct of hostilities are, with very few exceptions,
essentially identical regardless of the conflict classification.").
33. ICRC 28TH CONFERENCIE REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
34. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
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governed the American interpretation of the law of armed conflict was
"thrown into disarray." 35 During the first and most intense stage of the
war on terror, the United States held to the view that the jus ad bellum-the
law governing the right to use force-provided legal justification for the
United States to respond with military force, but the jus in bel/o-the law
governing how military force may be used-did not provide any rights to
those against whom that force would be applied. 36
President Obama has also stated that the United States is at war-"a
different kind of war"-with non-state actors: al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
their associated forces. 37 The Obama Administration has asserted
international legal authority to engage in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda
based on the United States's right to self-defense. 38 But this assertion of a
basis for action in international law does not always align with the existing
understandings of those legal foundations by other states or the ICRC.39
For example, while President Obama has indicated the approaching end
to the armed conflict in Afghanistan, he has also said that lethal action
may also be taken "outside of warzones," although "[b]eyond the Afghan

35. Geoffry S. Corn, What Law Applies to the War on Terror?, in THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE
LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael W Lewis et a]. eds., 2009).
36. This was not a necessary interpretation. Much closer in time to the drafting of the 1949
Geneva Conventions, the preeminent international law scholar Hersch Lauterpacht observed, "The
Convention imposes certain minimum obligations of humane treatment even in armed conflicts
which are not of an international character and even if the parties to the conflict, which may not be
states, are not parties to the Convention-an interesting example of obligations being imposed upon
entities which are not normally subjects of international law." Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at 361 (citing
Common Art. 3).
37. President Barack Obama, Address at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013),
http://www.whitchouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama
("[O]n
September 11th 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us, as clouds
of fire, metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning. This was a different kind of war. No
armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead, a group of
terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could .... Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our
effort not as a boundless 'global war on terror'-but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts
to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America .... Under domestic law,
and international law, the United States is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated
forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could
if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war-a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in
self-defense.").
38. Id.
39. John B. Bellinger III, Observations on the 150th Anniversary of the ICRC, 94 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 1223, 1224-25 (2012) ("The Bush Administration, of course, was and continues to be
criticised for not applying the privileges of the Third or Fourth Conventions to members of Al
Qaeda and the Taliban as a matter of law. The Bush Administration did apply most Geneva
provisions as a matter of policy. It is important to emphasize that the Obama Administration has not
changed this legal position and has not treated Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees as prisoners of war or
protected civilians. Nor has the Obama Administration concluded that Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I applies to Al Qaeda and the Taliban detainees.").
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theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces."4 0 Because alQaeda "does not follow a traditional command structure, wear uniforms,
carry its arms openly, or mass its troops at the borders of the nations it
attacks," the Administration has also asserted the right to do so "without
doing a separate self-defense analysis each time," without "being restricted
solely to 'hot' battlefields like Afghanistan," and based on a "broadened"
notion of what constitutes an imminent attack. 4 1Remarks by the President
and his advisors make clear that this decision-making is also premised on
the novelty of this war.42
Likewise, while the President has announced his intention to "bring law
of war detention to an end," he notes that when suspected terrorists are
captured, "we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a Military
Commission." 43 How that decision should be made seems to be primarily
results-driven: "In choosing between our federal courts and military
commissions in any given case, this Administration will remain focused on
one thing-the most effective way to keep that terrorist behind bars." 44
Thus, the Obama Administration "has expanded the ambit of its selfcongratulatory but unspecified application of the law of armed conflict as
a matter of policy. This takes the form of claims that a U.S. policy or law is
'informed by' or 'draws on' the laws of war, but never explaining in what
way." 45 If, as seems likely, the national security strategy of the United
40. Obama, supra note 37.
41. John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism,
Remarks at Harvard Law School: Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws
(Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offiec/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an.
42. Id. ("We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible
understanding of 'imminence' may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups, in part because
threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in
more traditional conflicts . . . Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism
partners have begun to recognize that the traditional conception of what constitutes an 'imminent'
attack should be broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological
innovations of terrorist organizations.'.
43. Obama, supra note 37. See also Memorandum from Brad Wiegmann and Colonel Mark
Martins to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, Detention Policy Task Force 4-5 (Jul.
20, 2009) available at http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/detention72009.pdf.
44. Brennan, supra note 41.
45. Chris Jenks, The King is Dead! Long Live the King! Why the U.S. is Content Applying Law
of War Treaties as a Matter of Policy (June 2014) (unpublished working paper) (on file with author)
(citing such ambiguous language in Executive Order 13,567, signed on Mar. 7, 2011). See also U.S.
at
available
REPORT
(2009)
DAY
PROGRESS
JUSTICE,
100
DEP'T
OF
("[IMhe
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2009/04/29/progress-report.pdf
Department worked with other agencies and departments to develop a new standard for the
government's authority to hold Guantanamo detainees . . . [T]his standard does not rely on the
President's authority as Commander in Chief independent of Congress's specific authorization.
Instead, it draws on the international laws of war to inform the statutory authority conferred by
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States will continue to rely on legal authority drawn from the law of armed
conflict, these ambiguities are disconcerting at the very least. Legal
authority without legal constraint is a dangerous combination under any
circumstance. Considering the extraordinary authority that the law of
armed conflict provides, the need for clarity concerning its limits will
remain both important and urgent. As Geoff Corn observed, using a
common shorthand for the law of armed conflict, this was the essential
post-9/11 problem: "invocation of the LOAC authority without a counterbalance of LOAC obligation was inconsistent with the historic purpose of
the [Geneva Convention] law." 46
Before considering the placement of those baseline limits in fighting
terrorism tomorrow, Part II of this Article considers a struggle with
transnational terrorists in a past lacking any international legal baseline at
all.
II. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
The Russian revolutions of 1917 were preceded by waves of violence
and futile attempts of the Russian state to stop it. The terrorists were
transnational non-state actors if ever there were any. In fact, one of the
venues considered for the 1899 Peace Conference, Berne, was rejected
because (in the words of the head of the American delegation to the
Conference, Andrew Dickson White): "The number of anarchists and
nihilists who had taken refuge there, and the murder of the Empress of
Austria by one of them shortly before, at Geneva, in broad daylight, had
thrown discredit over the ability of the Swiss Government to guarantee
safety to the conference." 47
The leaders of various terrorist groups could be found in the British
Library in London, the boulevards of Paris and Berlin, and, of course,
throughout the expanse of the Russian Empire. 48 Lenin, for example, left
Congress in the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which Congress passed in September
2001."); Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Speech at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar.
25, 2010) available at http://wvw.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm ("[W]ith regard to
individuals detained at Guantanamo, we explained in a March 13, 2009 habeas filing before the DC
federal court-and repeatedly in habeas cases since-that we are resting our detention authority on a
domestic statute-the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)-as informed by the
principles of the laws of war.).
46. Corn, shpra note 35, at 19.
47. ARTHUR EYFFINGER, THE 1899 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 40 (1999)

(quoting the

autobiography of A.D. White).
48. D.S. MIRSKY, RussLA: A SOCIAL HISTORY 260-62 (1952) (noting that "[the first cells of the
revolutionary movement were founded abroad..." and that their headquarters were later to be
found "in London, in Paris, or in Switzerland, where large colonies of Russian emigr6s grew up and
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Russia in 1900 for Zurich, Munich, and London after finishing his criminal
term of exile to Siberia. 49 He returned to St. Petersburg in 1905 (though
too late to join the 1905 Revolution) and again from Zurich in 1917, to
renamed Petrograd, on a specially arranged German train. 50 As flowed
terrorists, so too did the means of terrorism move across Europe:
different groups collaborated "[u]sing their connections with arms dealers
abroad, particularly in Belgium and England, ... in the complicated
process of purchasing and transporting arms and explosives materials into
Russia[.]"si Funding for these cross-border arms shipments and bombmaking laboratories led to enterprising collaborations not only between
different national movements but with various criminal groups. 52
There were so many terrorist organizations of various political stripes in
the decades preceding the February and October 1917 Russian revolutions
that it is hard to keep them all straight: populists, anarchists, and nihilists
filled the ranks of "Land and Liberty" (Zemlya i Volya) (founded 1876),
while the more violently minded among them split to form "The People's
Will" (Narodnaya volya) (founded 1879). Marxists could become
Social
"professional
revolutionaries" stocking Lenin's Bolshevik
Democrats (SD) (1903), or members of the "Combat Organization" of
the Socialist Revolutionaries (SR) (1902).53 The ideologies of nineteenth
century Russian terrorists varied as greatly as their social class-from
idealistic "declasse gentry" youths; to radicalized emerging proletariat; to
upstart, uneducated peasants, and (increasingly) police infiltrators and
agents provocateurs. 54 But by the late 1880s, the strongest movements
shared several traits in common: they were transnational, messianic, and
bent on the violent destruction of the imperial Russian government and
revolutionary transformation of the state.55 These groups saw themselves
as existential threats to the Russian Empire even if, after their varying

survived till 1917."). The founding congresses of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party were
held in Minsk (1898), Brussels and London (in 1903), where the Bolsheviks seized control. Reginald
E. Zelnik, Russian Workers and Revolulion, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF RUSSIA, VOL. 11 628
(Dominic Lieven ed., 2006).
49. ROBERT SERVICE, LENIN: A BIOGRAPHY 109, 129, 175 (2000).
50. Id. at 253-63.
51. ANNA GEIFMAN, THOU SHALT KiLL: REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM IN RUSSIA, 1894-1917
187 (1993).
52. Id. at 190-92.
53. HANS ROGGER, RUSSIA IN THE AGE OF MODERNISATION AND REVOLUTION, 1881-1917,
132-62 (1983); THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION passim (Harold
Shukman ed., 1988) [hereinafter BLACKWELL].
54. MIRSKY, supra note 48, at 260-64. RICHARD PIPEs, RUSSIA UNDER THE OLD REGIME 27075 (1992). GEIFMAN, supra note 51, at 11.
55. Zelnik, supra note 48, at 623-24.
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contributions toward that goal, only the Bolsheviks survived to claim the
mantle of destructor.
Terrorist cells were carefully organized for maximum tactical advantage
and minimum risk of infiltration. Cell members often knew no more than
one person from another cell. At the same time, different terrorist groups
active in Russia-whose acrimonious spokesmen outside of Russia often
criticized each other as much as the mutually despised regime-could put
aside their ideological differences to collaborate. As the chief of one
group asked another: "Why can't we work together? As far as I'm
concerned, there are no obstacles. It makes no difference to me whether
you are a Maximalist, an anarchist, or a Socialist-Revolutionary. We are
both terrorists. Let us combine our organizations in the interest of
terror."5 6
In fact, the transnational terrorist threat even invaded popular literature,
in Russia and abroad. Ivan Turgenev's Fathersand Sons captures the rise of
a radicalized new generation, while Fyodor Dostoyevsky's The Possessed
explores the mind of a radical nihilist. (Dostoyevsky allegedly once
confessed that "he would have been incapable of turning over to the
police hypothetical terrorists overheard talking about a bomb planted by
them in the Winter Palace.") 57 Joseph Conrad's The Secret Agent, published
in 1907 but set in 1886, revolves around a plot to blow up the Greenwich
Observatory in London. (The idea probably came to Conrad from an
actual event: In 1894, a young French anarchist named Martial Bourdin
attempted to blow up the Observatory.) 58 The novel imagines a conspiracy
led by the first secretary of a foreign (presumably Russian) embassy in
London, who manipulates an agent provocateur embedded in an anarchist
group. The diplomat's goal is to jolt an international conference into a
more aggressive stance against terrorism: "Its deliberations upon
international action for the suppression of political crime don't seem to
get anywhere. England lags. This country is absurd with its sentimental
regard for individual liberty." 5 ' His means are the terrorists themselves and

his explanation for the seemingly senseless destruction of a purely
scientific outpost is remarkably contemporary:
This is what you should try for. An attempt upon a crowned head
or on a president is sensational enough in a way, but not so much
as it used to be. It has entered into the general conception of the
56. GEIFMAN, supra note 51, at 183 (quoting Boris Savinkov, head of the SR Combat
Organization, to Mikhail Sokolov, leader of the Maximalists, an SR offshoot).
57. PIPES, supra note 54, at 275.
58. Royal Museums Greenwich, Propaganda by Deed The Greenwich Observatoy Bomb of 1894,
undated, http://wrwwnmm.ac.uk/servcr/show/conWebDoc.413.
59. JOSEPH CONRAD, THE SECRET AGENT 29 (Oxford World's Classics 1998) (1907).
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existence of all chiefs of state. It's almost conventional-especially
since so many presidents have been assassinated ... . But what is

one to say to an act of destructive ferocity so absurd as to be
incomprehensible, inexplicable, almost unthinkable; in fact, mad?
Madness alone is truly terrifying, inasmuch as you cannot placate it
either by threats, persuasion, or bribes. 60
By any measure, these fin-de-sikle terrorists were more successful at their
stated goals than al-Qaeda has been with its objectives. By the time of the
Second Hague Peace Conference in mid-1907, these terrorists had
succeeded (on the fifth attempt) in assassinating Czar Alexander 11.61
Terrorists also killed his son, the Grand Duke. 62 One of the first terrorist
attacks, a daylight knifing in St. Petersburg in 1878, took the life of the
Chief of the Gendarmes. 63 Other assassinations included the last Czar's
Education Minister, 64 two Interior Ministers, 65 his Prime Minister, 66 and
well over a thousand other government officials. 67 Thousands of civilians
were killed or wounded in the course of this campaign. 68 An early attempt
to assassinate Prime Minister Stolypin in August 1906 by a suicide-bomber
faction of the Socialist Revolutionary Party failed to kill the prime
minister, but succeeded in killing twenty-seven others and injuring sixty,
including Stolypin's children. 69 During 1907, terrorist violence averaged
eighteen casualties a day.70 In the two years following the second Hague
Peace Conference, from January 1908 to May 1910, 732 government
60. Id. at 31, 33.
61. Alexander II was killed by a bomb thrown by a member of Narodnaya volya in 1881. Other
attempts-including gunshots fired at his carriage and the bombing of his train and the Winter
Palace-occurred in 1879 and 1880, to which may also be added an early, separate attempt in 1866.
NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY, A HISTORY OF RussIA 380, 384 (5th ed. 1993); 3 PAUL MILIUKOV,

HISTORY OF RUSSIA 71, 82-84, 90-91 (1969).
62. Socialist Revolutionary member I.P Kalyaev assassinated Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich
in February 1905. BLACKWELL, supra note 53, at 86..
63. PwIS, supra note 54, at 299.
64. Socialist Revolutionary member P. V. Karpovich assassinated the Minister of Education, N. P.
Bogolepov, in February 1901. BLACKWELL, supra note 53, at 86; GEIFMAN, supra note 51, at 18.
65. Socialist Revolutionary member S. V. Balmashev assassinated Minister of the Interior, D. S.
Sipyyagin, in July 1904. Similarly, Sazonov, another member of the Socialist Revolutionary,
assassinated V. K. von Plehve, another Minister of the Interior, in July 1904. BIACKWELL, supra note

53, at 86.
66. Prime Minister Stolypin was shot and killed in September 1911.
67. Between February 1905 and May 1906,Jonathan Daly approximates 1,075 state officials killed
or wounded. Jonathan Daly, Police and Revoltionaries, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF RUSSIA, VOL.
2 supra note 48, at 647. In 1906, he states that "as many as" 1,126 government officials were killed,

1,506 wounded. Id. at 648.
68. GElFMAN, supra note 51, at 264 n.59.
69. BLACKWEIL, supra note 53, at 87; GEIFMAN, supra note 51, at 74.
70. GEIFMAN, supra note 51, at 21.
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officials and 3,051 citizens were killed, and 4,000 wounded, in terrorist
attacks. 71 These figures do not include robberies and other acts of
destructive violence directed at property, transport, and state
infrastructure, nor does the listing of top targets for assassination convey
the much larger number of terrorist attacks that occurred outside the
imperial capital and in the imperial periphery. As Anna Geifman described
the rising tide of less discriminating violence after the 1905 Revolution:
Of the 671 employees of the Ministry of the Interior killed or
injured by terrorists between October of 1905 and the end of
April 1906, only 13 held high administrative positions, while the
other 658 were city policemen, coachmen, and security personnel.
It became especially common for the new breed of professional
terrorist to shoot or toss bombs into passing military and Cossack
units, or their barracks, without provocation. In general, the
wearing of any uniform was sufficient to qualify an individual as a
potential candidate for a terrorist bullet or for other methods of
attack widely adopted after 1905.72

As the imperial government felt ever more besieged, it relied
increasingly on its military. The civilian casualties on "Bloody Sunday"
1905 were caused by a cavalry charge followed by eight volleys into the
crowd from a rifle regiment, neither of which were considered to be
unusual methods of crowd dispersal.73 As one eminent historian of Russia
described the regime, "as far as terrorist activities were concerned, Russia
was to be treated by its government as if it were occupied enemy territory.
. . . Once a year, the Chief of Gendarmes submitted to the emperor a
report on campaigns his organization had waged against subversives which
read somewhat like a summary of military operations." 74
A year before Czar Alexander II's death, Russia's special police forcethe so-called Third Department-was subsumed into the Ministry of the
Interior and its Gendarmerie placed under the control of the Ministry of
71. DOUGLAS SMITH, FORMER PEOPLE: THE FINAL DAYS OF THE RUSSIAN ARISTOCRACY 58

(2012).
72. GEIFMAN, supra note 51, at 40 (footnotes omitted).
73. SIDNEY HARCAVE, FIRST BLOOD: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1905 86-91 (1964) ("It
was standard procedure for mounted police and cavalry (usually Cossacks), free to use nagaikas and
the flats of their sabers, to ride down recalcitrant crowds and force them to disperse. What if these
measures failed? Commanding officers could order their men to fire warning volleys; and if these did
not bring compliance, they could then order that the firing be directed into the crowds."). See also
ABRAHAM ASCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF 1905: RUSSIA IN DISARRAY 91 (1988) ("Troops fired
indiscriminately, hitting people who were trying to escape as well as innocent bystanders."). Official
(and likely low) figures placed the death toll at 130, 299 injured. Id. Others put the death toll much
higher, estimating "800 dead and many more wounded." BLACKWELL, supra note 53, at 105.
74. PIPES, supra note 54, at 299, 301.
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War. 75 After his death, so-called temporary regulations systematized
piecemeal legislation under which military field courts could try civilians
for select state crimes in closed proceedings conducted not just under
military law, but the military law applicable in time of war (while, at the
same time, a soldier or officer would be tried under the military law
applicable in time of peace!). 76 Between July 1906 and April 1907, these
courts "were obliged to pass judgment in no more than two days and to
carry out the sentence (usually death) within one day"; they were
responsible for the execution of "as many as 1,000 alleged terrorists."7 7
Then, unlike now, no one debated whether these attacks rose to such a
degree that they could be said to have triggered the law of armed conflict.
Decades would pass before anyone would seriously consider the idea that
conflicts "not of an international character" could even be the subject of
international law. But if today's law of armed conflict applied in the final
years of the Romanov dynasty, what result? Considering the duration and
intensity of these hostilities, could it be said (however anachronistically)
that Russia was in an armed conflict with one or more organized and
armed non-state actors? That these fighters were civilians directly
participating in hostilities?
III. THE MARTENS CLAUSE

Consider now the development of public international law in the
context of the increasingly mechanized violence of late nineteenth-century
war. Terrible new armaments like expanding bullets, asphyxiating gas, and
war balloons multiplied the carnage on European battlefields. The Battle
of Solferino in 1859, witnessed by one of the future founders of the Red
Cross, motivated individuals and nation-states alike to create new
institutions and bodies of law to regulate the effects of these changes. 78
Not only had the nineteenth century ushered in new weapons, it had
grossly expanded the ranks of fighters. The French Revolution created the
first state to raise a modern army through universal conscription: "Tout
Francais est soldat et se doit A la defense de la patrie." 79 Until then, most
75. Daly, supra note 67, at 637-39.
76. William C. Fuller, Jr., Ciilians in Russian Miitary Courts, 1881-1904, 41 RussIAN REv. 288, 292
(1982). Of 73 trials of members of the People's Will terrorist organization conducted in the 1880s,
42 were held in military courts. Id. at 293. See also PipEs, supra note 54, at 299, 305.
77. Daly, supra note 67, at 648. During the period of use of summary military courts-martial,
August 1906 to April 1907, more than 1,000 people were shot or hanged as revolutionaries, terrorists,
or expropriators. GE1FMAN, supra note 51, at 227.
78. J. HENRY DUNANT, A MEMORY OF SOLFEIUNO 9 (American National Red Cross 1959)

(1862).
79.

"Every Frenchman is a soldier and has the duty to defend his country."

(Author's
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of the European Great Powers relied primarily on professional
mercenaries (Russia, as always, was an exception: between 1705 and 1874,
the czars relied on peasants drafted for periods ranging from life to 25
years of service [nearly the same thing]; in 1874, universal military
conscription regardless of class was initiated.)8 0 As this concept spread
through Europe, larger armies expanded war's effects further and further
beyond the set-piece battlefields of the past. 8 1
The 1899 Hague Peace Conference was not the First international effort
seeking to moderate these forces. Earlier attempts at international
agreement achieved varying success. In 1864, the Geneva Convention
sought to ensure safe access to the battlefield for neutral medics to provide
relief to all wounded belligerents. In 1868, Czar Alexander II's St.
Petersburg Declaration sought the prohibition of small-sized exploding
bullets (which had little military value but greatly increased suffering). 82
Fulminating ammunition would eventually be rendered obsolete by
inevitable technological progress. But the Russians, who achieved the initial
breakthrough and feared its proliferation and use against their own
soldiers, led the drive for its abolition. 83 The Declaration established an
important principle: even belligerents fully privileged to fight under the
laws of war do not enjoy unlimited rights to do so. 84 Another attempt in
Brussels in 1874, also called by the Czar, ended without agreement.8 5 The
Brussels Declaration itself "drew its life and spirit" from the Lieber Code
adopted by President Lincoln in 1863.86 Perhaps a more successful effort,
and certainly a more lasting one than these, was the establishment in 1873
of the Institut de Droit international in Ghent.87 These all helped form a
translation). See Art. 1, Loi relative au mode deformation de l'armie de terre du 19 Fructidor, an VT de la
Republique une et indivisible (loi Jourdan of Sept. 5, 1798), BULLETIN DES LOIS DE LA RIEPUBLIQUE

FRANCAISE (NO. 223) (1798), http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k56398t/f492.image
80. William C. Fuller, Jr., The ImperialArmy, in THE CAMBRIDGE. HISTORY OF RUSSIA, VOL. 2
supra note 48, at 532, 544; see also H.T. Willetts, The Imperial Armed Forces, in THE CAMBRIDGE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIA AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 508 (Archie Brown et al. eds., 1994).
81. EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 258.
82. Scott, supra note 1, at xv.
83. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, DEC.LARATION RENOUNCING THE USE, IN TIME OF
WAR, OF EXPLOSIVE PROJECTILES UNDER 400 GRAMMES WEIGHT (1868), https://www.icrc.or-

g/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/52d68dl4de6160e0cl2563da005fdblb/dbe0afb2065e0d7ecl25641e0031

f38c?O

penDocument.
84. I thank Geoff Corn for noting this treaty as a landmark for this vital principle.
85. Scott, supra note 1, at xv; see also WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND
THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 213 (1908).
86. Scott, supra note 1, at xviii-xix. Martens acknowledged both the Brussels Declaration of 1874
and the Lieber Code in his opening remarks as President of the Subcommission charged with
codification of the laws and customs of war. EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 269.
87. MARTril KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 41 (2001). The story of the development of this organization and
the influence of its founders and later members is brilliantly told by Koskenniemi.
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foundation of sorts for the Hague Conference (which was called by

Alexander's grandson, Czar Nicholas II).
The 1899 Hague Conference meant to build on these piecemeal past
efforts. The conference was held at the House in the Woods near The
Hague. 88 The Convention in which the Martens Clause made its first
appearance sought to regulate the conduct of occupying powers and
codify the rights and duties of belligerents and civilians. In addition to the
codification of the laws of war, the Conference sought to establish
processes for factual inquiry, mediation, and arbitration of international
disputes; adapt the 1864 Geneva Convention to maritime warfare; and
proscribe or regulate the use of certain armaments.89 The work of the
Convention was organized into three commissions, which were themselves
compartmentalized into various types of working groups.90 Martens was
President of the Second Commission and chaired its Second
Subcommission, which was tasked "to revise the Declaration concerning
the laws and customs of war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of
Brussels, which has remained unratified to the present day." 91
The Conference was not called to end any particular war-in-progress or
rein in any fast-massing army.92 But past wars loomed in the background.
Looming largest was the Franco-Prussian War (a.k.a. The War of 1870)
that destroyed the Second French Empire and unified Germany.93 In that
88. HULL, supra note 85, at 7.
89. Scott, supra note 1, at xvi-xix; HUi.L, supra note 85, at 28-31, 45-47.
90. HULL, supra note 85, at 28-31; see also JAMES BROWN SCorT, THE HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, VOL. 1, at 51-54 (1909) [hereinafter Scott (1909)].
91. EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 263.
92. Frits Kalshoven, Introduction to THE CENTENNIAL OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL PEACE
CONFERENCE: REPORTS & CONCLUSIONS 1 (Frits Kalshoven ed., 2000); see also Rescrpt of the Russian
Emperor, Aug. 24, 1898 (Aug. 12, 1898 O.S), reprinted in Scott, supra note 1, at 1 ("the Imperial
Government thinks that the present moment would be very favorable for seeking, by means of
international discussion, the most effectual means of insuring to all peoples the benefits of a real and
durable peace, and above all, of putting an end to the progressive development of the present
armaments."); Russian Circular, January 11, 1899 (Dec. 30, 1898 OS.), in id at 3-5 (expanding on
subjects for consideration at the Conference, particularly "7. To revise the Declaration concerning
the laws and customs of war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels, which has remained
unratified to the present day."). For an analysis of the cynical responses to the Rescript and Circular
at the time, see EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 16-40. For a current appraisal of ulterior Russian
motives, see Eyffinger, supra note 13, at 23 ("Modern research has long verified the move for a Peace
Conference as a clever bid for a military moratorium, thus to better implement Russia's ambitious
schemes for upgrading the huge Empire's dramatic infrastructure.").
93. This war had also influenced the failed 1874 Brussels meeting, in which Martens had played a
significant preparatory role, and made a considerable impression on Martens himself:
During the War of 1870-71, being close to the theatre of war, I collected from the
newspapers of all countries and through personal contacts all the facts which established a
violation of the laws and customs of war. Already I had come to the conclusion that the
establishment by the governments themselves of these laws and customs was entirely
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roughly nine-month conflict, the larger Prussian army dominated northern
France and ultimately laid siege to Paris itself. A significant thorn in the
side of this organized, uniformed, traditional fighting force was the socalledfrancs-tireurs.These fighters were not members of any state's military.
Rather, they were loosely organized but unofficial groups of private
riflemen. They attacked uniformed troops in sniper fashion and harassed
the movements of enemy combatants by exploding bridges and railways. 94
Although some wore uniforms and were authorized by the French state,
"others fought entirely on their own initiative and for the most part were
distinguishable from the French peasants only by a badge which was
invisible at a distance and easily removable." 9 5 The Prussian troops
harassed by these fighters spared little effort to distinguish one type from
the other; one historical source declared that "[i]n the knapsack of each
Franc-tirearwas found a complete suit of plain clothes." 96 Unless an enemy
fighter both wore a uniform with permanent insignia "recognizable at gunshot distance" and "carried papers showing that they formed part of the
French army," their treatment upon capture would be harsh, ranging from
a decade in prison to death. 97
What rights did the inhabitants of occupied territory retain, and which
would they sacrifice if they resisted their foreign masters? Were francs-tireurs
deserving of some form of combatant immunity for their efforts to
defend their country or were they not organized and regularized enough to
qualify as combatants at all? In many ways, thosefrancs-tireurs, who in James
Molony Spaight's resonant phrase, "claim now the privileges of
combatants now those of the peaceful inhabitants,"9 8 might be compared
to civilians directly participating in hostilities today (which remains very
much a continuing controversy). 9 To varying degrees, the Additional
necessary in order to prevent endless accusations and merciless reprisals. In 1873 1 had the
honour to submit this idea to my noted superior, Chancellor Prince Gorchakov. General
Count Miliutin, at the time War Minister and one of the most outstanding Russian public
figures, not only reacted sympathetically to this matter but hastened to extend his
influential support for it. The initial draft convention on the laws and customs of warfare,
prepared by myself, was subjected to detailed and attentive discussion in a commission of
eminent Russian military officers under the chairmanship of General Miliutin himself.
PUSTOGAROv, OUR MARTENS, supra note 10, at 109. Martens was a member of the Russian
delegation. Id. at 108. It should be noted that Pustogarov gives a confusing citation for the source of
this quote, noting one in the body of the text and a different one in a corresponding footnote.
94. David Turns, Classfication, Administration, and Treatment of Battlefield Detainees, in COUNTERTERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 438 (Ana Maria Salinas de Frias et al., eds. 2012).
95. JAMES MOLONY SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 42 (1911); see also Watkin, supra note 26, at

20-21.
96. SPAIGHT, supra note 95, at 43.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Dr. Nils Meltzer, International Committee of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
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Protocols to the Geneva Convention provide that such civilians lose their
protection from being made the lawful objects of attack during and for
such time as they directly participate in hostilities but retain certain
fundamental guarantees concerning their treatment upon falling into the
power of the adverse party.'oo The questions raised about the status of the
franc-tireur then were essentially the same as those raised by concerns for
today's "revolving door" civilian fighter, or what the United States now
calls "unprivileged belligerents."'o' Compare, for example, the concern
expressed above by Spaight in 1911 with that of Yoram Dinstein today: "a
person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the hat of a civilian
and the helmet of a soldier."1 02
The delegates in the Second Commission (of which Martens was
President) were able to agree that "[tlhe laws, rights, and duties of war
apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps," at least
to the extent that those groups fulfilled criteria that sufficiently
distinguished their members from ordinary civilians. 103 To qualify, the
of Direct Pariapationin Hostilities under International HumanitarianLaw, 90 INT'L REV RED CROSS 991

(2008).
100. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 45, 51, 75, June 8, 1977,

1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
101 . This term, like its predecessor, "unlawful enemy combatant", remains somewhat
controversial. The terms seem intended to connote those who are deemed not to enjoy the
combatant's privilege to kill or destroy free from civilian criminal sanction and yet are not fully
accorded the status of civilians. Although these terms have been defined in U.S. domestic law, in the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 and its 2009 amendments, respectively, see Military Commissions

Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2601 (2006), and National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1802, 123 Stat. 2575 (codified at 10

&

U.S.C. § 948a(7) (2009)), even the U.S. Army judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School
teaches its students-future JAG officers-that these terms "are not widely recognized outside the
U.S. as relevant to determining who qualifies for civilian status under the LOAC." INT'L
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP'T, U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAI.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW
OF
ARMED
CONFLICT
DESKBOOK
98
(2013)
available
at

https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2013.pdf.
102. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HosTLITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT 35 (2d ed. 2010). For Dinstein, "[tjhe wearing of civilian clothes lies at the core of
the problem." Id. at 39 n.216. The ICRC takes a broader view of the possibility of reclaiming civilian
status. Compareid. at 147 ("The present writer and others believe that a person directly participating in
hostilities loses his civilian status and effectively becomes a combatant (and, for that matter, an
unlawful combatant under customary international law.)" (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)),
with ICRC, supra note 99, at 1015 ("Where civilians engage in hostile acts on a persistently recurrent
basis, it may be tempting to regard not only each hostile act as direct participation in hostilities, but
even their continued intent to carry out unspecified hostile acts in the future. However, any extension
of the concept of direct participation in hostilities beyond specific acts would blur the distinction
made in IHL between temporary, activity-basedlossofprotection (due to direct participation in hostilities),
and continuous, status- orfunction-based loss ofpmtection (due to combatant status or continuous combat
function)."(internal citations omitted)).
103. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of Far on Iand, Annex to the Convention with Respect to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 1, in Scott, supra note 1, at 51.
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group must have a responsible command hierarchy, and its members must
wear "a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;" "carry arms
openly;" and "conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war." 104 This was an expansion of the protections of
combatant immunity beyond traditional armies, which the delegates
expanded even further to include civilians participating in a levie en maste,
that is, a "population of a territory which has not been occupied who, on
the enemy's approach, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading
troops without having time to organize themselves" in such a way as to
fulfill the above criteria.105
This extension did not satisfy everyone, for it did not go far enough. It
still left out a variety of types of resistance fighters. To note only one
example mentioned above, the guerrilla tactics of some francs-tireurs, who
fought and then dissolved back into the population, were successful
precisely because they did not comply with the agreed criteria for
extending the status of belligerents to them. For smaller states like
Belgium, the patriotism that led such fighters to rise up was not a source
of defense its delegates wished to discourage or outlaw.106 On the other
hand, the larger states like Germany and Russia saw no benefit to them
(and considerable harm to civilian populations they sought to pacify as
occupiers) in extending rights without duties to the franc-tireur.107 Consider
how the remarks of a German delegate resonate with concerns today
about the insurgent who, with neither uniform nor command control by
any organized state power, attacks a state's armed forces and then melts
back into the civilian population:
Is it so difficult, moreover, to hoist some distinctive sign? A mere
arm badge will suffice. Is it too much to demand that they bear
arms openly and that they observe the laws of war, a thing which
they expect and of which they are assured on the part of their
adversaries? .

.

. And since we are speaking of humanity, it is time

104. Id. at art. 1, 1-4.
105. Id. at art. 2.
106. Consider, e.g., the stirring remarks of General Kiinzli of Switzerland, in praise of the people
of another small country, the one hosting the conference: "And if you will allow me to cite an
example to you, I will ask you whether the most glorious epoch of the country in which we are
enjoying such generous hospitality was not the one in which it had to sustain a long and arduous
struggle against a powerful invader, when the whole Dutch people fought with a valiance and
perseverance without parallel for its independence, freedom and convictions? ... [D]o not punish
love of country; do not adopt rigorous measures against peoples who rise in a mass to defend their
soil." EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 304.
107. Rotem Giladi, The Enactment of Irony: Reflections on the Origins of the Martens Clause, 25 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 847, 850 (2014) ("Broadly speaking, this was a debate between small and great powers. The
former, led by Belgium, had some support from Great Britain; the latter consisted of Russia and
Germany.").
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to remember that soldiers are also men, and have a right to be
treated with humanity. Soldiers who, exhausted by fatigue after a
long march or a battle, come to rest in a village have a right to be
sure that the peaceful inhabitants shall not change suddenly into
furious enemies.10 8
Thus, the problem of francs-ireursthreatened the Conference. The Great
Powers of Europe saw these fighters as deserving of harsh punishment,
not the rights of belligerents.1 0 9 Their conduct was not to be condoned by
granting any legal status or protections under the law. Other states (mostly
smaller countries who feared the speed with which they could be-and
frequently were-overrun by larger armies) wanted the franc-tireurs to fall
under the protection of the law of war notwithstanding their guerilla
tactics and loose organization as insurgents.11 0 Martens recognized the
difficulty of squaring this circle: "We wish to save the life and property of
the weak, the unarmed, and the inoffensive, but we by no means wish
either to prescribe laws for heroes or to curb the impulse of patriots.""'
There were, of course, many other conflicts between small and great
powers concerning drafts proposed at the Conference, but this one was
perceived to be a threat to the entire enterprise. 112
The Martens Clause that emerged was the successful compromise that
saved the conference. One of the Belgian diplomats who led the
opposition, Edouard Descamps, couched his delegation's objections in
terms of "the cause of humanity," "the demands of civilization," and "the
lessening of the evils of war." 11 3 Martens may have seized upon these
108. EYFFINGR, supra note 47, at 305 (quoting the German delegate Colonel Gross von
Schwarzhoff); see also THr REPORTS TO THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907 141-142
(ames Brown Scott ed., 1917) [hereinafter Scott (1917)] (referencing similar remarks by Col. Gross
von Schwarzhoff, as summarized by the reporter Mr. Rodin).
109. SPAIGHT, supra note 95, at 41-45. Spaight quotes Martens in this section both for a
description of the severe punishments meted out to francs-tireurs by their German captors and to
punished civilian populations deemed collaborators by advancing German armies, id. at 41, n.4, and
for the conclusion that public opinion in "the neutral states of Europe" held this treatment to be
"too cruel." Id. at 45 n.2.
110. V.V. Pustogarov, The Martens Clause in International LaW, 1 J. HISTORY OF INT'L L. 125, 126

(1999).
111. EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 305.
112. Pustogarov, supra note 110, at 126; Jochen von Bernstorff, Martens Clause, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/vie-

w/ 10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690c327?rskey=Zsx3hG&result=1
IL.

&prd=EP-

113. Pustogarov, supra note 110, at 126; PUSTOGAROV, OUR MARTENS, supra note 10, at 176.
There appears to be disagreement in the sources whether Descamps or his superior colleague, M.
Beernaert, spoke in opposition. See HULL, supra note 85, at 215-20 (citing Beernaert's contributions,
but not Descamps, in debate over belligerent status); id. at 243-56 (citing both Beernaert and
Descamps regarding debate over the occupation of hostile territory); see also Edouard Rolin, Report to
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words in formulating the preambular clause that bears his name and saved
the Conference.1 14 The Clause, translated into English from the original
French, states the following:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not
included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and
belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity,
and the requirements of the public conscience.11 5
Summarizing Martens's arguments, Antonio Cassese noted an aspect of
particular relevance to the propensity of the Bush Administration to
exploit perceived gaps in the law of armed conflict. According to Cassese,
Martens argued the following:
[T]o fail to agree upon specific treaty rules would have the
consequence of showing to the military that for the second time
(the first being the Brussels Conference of 1874) experts and
diplomats could not fashion rules on the matter. Consequently, the
military would feel free to interpret the laws of warfare as they
pleased.116
The core of the Clause, which first appeared in the Preamble to the
Hague Convention, reappears in Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to the
the Conferencefrom the Second Commission on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, in Scott (1917), supra
note 108, at 139-41 (citing Beernacrt's remarks); EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 271 (citing only the
remarks of Beernaert). But see id at 303 (citing remarks of Descamps on belligerent status). This may
be attributable to the fact that "[tihere was not a single stenographer among its secretaries, and the
minutes of each meeting were not verbatim reports, nor were any copies of them, nor any
documents connected with the proceedings, permitted to be published." HULL, supra note 85, at 22.
Research in this area is further complicated by the fact that, although French was the official language
of the Conference and the ordinary (although not exclusive) language of communication, see Scott
(1909), supra note 90, at 53, most English-language texts omit reference to any source for translations
of reported speech.
114. Pustogarov, supra note 110, at 127 ("Being well acquainted with Descamps through the
Ghent Institute of International Law, Martens asked to be given the instruction received by
Descamps. He sat on it until late at night, and in the morning of the following day, he presented his
proposal to the commission.").
115. Scott, supra note 1, at 48. The French text is: "En attendant qu'un code plus complet des lois
de la guerre puisse tre edicte, les Hautes Parties contractantes jugent opportune de constater que,
dans les cas non compris dans les dispositions reglementaires adoptees par Elles, les populations et
les belligerants restent sous la sauveguarde et sous l'empire des principes du droit des gens, tells qu'ils
resultant des usages etablis entre nations civilisees, des lois de l'humanite et des exigencies de la
conscience publique."
116. Antonio Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L.
187, 195 (2000).
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Geneva Conventions, the 1977 treaty that supplements the scope of
application of the Geneva Conventions in international ("Common Article
2") conflicts. 117 A more abbreviated form appears in the Preamble to
Additional Protocol II, which develops and supplements the Geneva
Conventions in non-international ("Common Article 3") conflicts that
meet a certain material threshold." 8 (As will be noted below, this manner
of truncation is significant.) It also appears in the concluding paragraphs
of each of the articles covering denunciation of the four Geneva
Conventions."1 9 Thus, a connection is established to the Martens Clause
for armed conflicts to which neither additional protocol applies. (The
Geneva Conventions do not contain preambles, which led the drafters to
conclude that the Martens Clause was most appropriately included in their
respective articles of denunciation, "in order to underline in a succint [sic]
fashion that even denunciation could not result in a legal void.")120 Of
course, if no "armed conflict" is deemed to exist, then the Martens Clause,
the Additional Protocols, the Geneva Conventions, the customary
international law of armed conflict-none of these apply.
Concededly, there is not just one interpretation of the Martens Clause.
Many scholars have analyzed the merits of broad and narrow
interpretations of the Martens Clause.121 Some have viewed the Clause as a
117. Protocol I, supra note 100 ("In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience.").
118. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) preamble, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 [hereinafter Protocol II] ("Recalling that, in cases not covered by the law in
force, the human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates
of the public conscience"). Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts not
covered by Additional Protocol I that involve non-state armed groups "which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of [the State Party's] territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol" and that are not
"isolated and sporadic acts of violence" that do not rise to the level of armed conflicts. Id.
119. See Geneva I-IV, supra note 30, arts. 63, 62, 142, and 158, respectively ("[Denunciation] shall
in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the conflict shall remain bound to fulfill by
virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience."); see also
Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J.

INT'L L. 78, 78 n.3 (2000).
120. Zimmermann, supra note 11, at 38 (¶ 53).
121. See, e.g., Giladi supra note 107, at 853 ("Martens' response remains a classic example of power
politics veiled by humanitarian rhetoric; it also cunningly harped on the political and professional
sensitivities besetting his audience."); see also Cassese, supra note 116, at 187-216; Pustogarox, supra
note 110, at 125-35; Emily Crawford, The Modern Relevance of the Martens Clause, in ISIL YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE LAW, VOL. 6, at 1-18 (2006); Rupert
Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Lans of Armed Conflict, 37 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 125-34 (1997);
von Bernstorff, supra note 112; and, of course, Pictet's commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and
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signifier of background principles of customary international law that the
ratification of treaties may not be seen to erase. 122 Still others would point
to the reference to "public conscience" as an additional, determinable
source of public international law that constrains state action beyond
treaties, perhaps as a source of customary international law or perhaps
even as a free-standing constraint. 123 Recent and thorough consideration
of its application may be found in the various written submissions to, and
(primarily dissenting) opinions by, the International Court of justice in
1996 in its advisory opinion on nuclear weapons.1 24 As Rupert Ticehurst
notes, "[t]he positions advocated by States in their submissions to the ICJ
on the issue of nuclear weapons and the differing opinions the judges gave
in response reflect the continuing divide in international law between
positive and natural law."1 25
IV "PROTECTION & EMPIRE": INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND

SOVEREIGNTY

It is not necessary to join this dispute about application and content in
order to note the role the Martens Clause played in salvaging the first
Hague Peace Conference. Its importance is underscored by its recurrence
in subsequent international treaties and judicial opinions. And, as the
International Court of justice noted, it "has proved to be an effective
their additional protocols.
122. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL.
HUMANITARIAN LAW 31 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008). See also Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No.
IT-95-16-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 525, 527 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14 2000) ("True,
this Clause may not be taken to mean that the 'principles of humanity' and the 'dictates of public
conscience' have been elevated to the rank of independent sources of international law, for this
conclusion is belied by international practice. However, this Clause enjoins, as a minimum, reference
to those principles and dictates any time a rule of international humanitarian law is not sufficiently
rigorous or precise: in those instances the scope and purport of the rule must be defined with
reference to those principles and dictates . . . This is however an area where opinio imis sie necessitatis
may play a much greater role than usus, as a result of the aforementioned Martens Clause. In the light
of the way States and courts have implemented it, this Clause clearly shows that principles of
international humanitarian law may emerge through a customary process under the pressure of the
demands of humanity or the dictates of public conscience, even where State practice is scant or
inconsistent. The other element, in the form of opinio necessitatis, crystallising as a result of the
imperatives of humanity or public conscience, may turn out to be the decisive element heralding the
emergence of a general rule or principle of humanitarian law.").
123. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, 40611 (Shahabuddeen,J., dissenting).
124. These positions are nicely summarized by Ticehurst, supra note 121, at 126-28. The
Advisory Opinion itself (as opposed to the opinions submitted by its individual members) gave less
treatment to the Martens Clause. Nevertheless, it does appear that the Court concluded that the
Martens Clause is a norm of customary international law "whose continuing existence and
applicability is not to be doubted," not merely an aspirational statement. See Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, at TT 84, 87.
125. Ticehurst, supra note 121, at 131. Accord Cassese, supra note 116, at 210.
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means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology," not to
mention a constant reminder of the evolving nature of armed struggles
more generally.1 26 These are all indicia that the Clause continues to capture
an international consensus that states should no longer feel any freedom to
return to an international environment in which they may exploit the non
liquet to obtain strategic or tactical benefit against other states or non-state
adversaries.
This itself is a substantial change in public international law. It is one
that the legal position of the Bush Administration does not appear to have
recognized. That administration's view of the Geneva Conventions was a
classic a contrario argument: since the armed struggle against international
terrorism naturally supposed a response based on the law of armed
conflict, but did not fit within the textual confines of Common Articles 2
or 3 (being neither "international armed conflicts" nor "armed conflicts
not of an international nature"), the Bush Administration argued that its
actions were not governed by any law of armed conflict.1 27 At the same
time, the Bush Administration claimed authority to apply "the law of war
to a conflict to which the Convention does not apply."128 Of all the
sources to cite for support for this contention, the Administration cited
Article 142 of the III Geneva Conventions, which contains the
reconstituted Martens Clause!1 29 As Marko Milanovic observed: "It must
be noted that it certainly takes some audacity to cite the Martens Clause,
of all things, which embodies the humanitarian spirit of the laws of armed
conflict, as support for the thesis that there are armed conflicts which are
governed by the law of war but are not regulated by it, and all for the
30
purpose of torturing suspected terrorists for information."1
The Martens Clause rejects this a contrario argument because it rejects
two fundamental foundations for this interpretation of humanitarian
126. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, supra note 17, at

178.
127. See, e.g., Memorandum from George W. Bush to Vice President, et al. supra note 23, at ¶ 3.
For an early and prescient counter-argument, and perhaps the first to use the term "transnational
armed conflict," see Geoffrey S. Corn, "Snersin the Minaret-Whatis the Rule?" The Lan, of War and
the Protectionof CulturalProperly:A Complex Equation, ARMY LAW., 28, 31 n.27 (Jul. 2005).
128. Brief for Respondents, Hamdan v Rumsfeld, supra note 24, at 26.
129. Id. at 26 n.5.
130. Marko Milanovic, Lessons for Human Rghts and Humanitarian Law in the War on Terror:
Comparing Famdan and the Israeli Targeted Killings Case, 89 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 373, 377 (2007)
("Here we have the first example of the Martens Clause being cited by a government for purposes
which are everything but humanitarian."); see also Hans-Joachim Heintze, Terrorism and Asymmetric
ConflictsA Role for the Martens Clause?, in A WISER CENTURY? JUDICIAL DISPUTE SEYTrLEMENT,
DISARMAMENT AND THE LAWS OF WAR 100 YEARS AFTER THE SEcOND HAGUE PIACE
CONFERENCE 429, 432-33 (Thomas Giegerich ed., 2009) (criticizing this "quite unique" and
"strange interpretation" of Article 142 for its historical, logical, and humanitarian inconsistencies).
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protections: first, the return to a world in which public international law is
composed of nothing more than accretions of sovereign will; and second,
an interpretation of international law that permits a state to invoke the
authority of armed conflict while simultaneously disavowing any
31
humanitarian obligations related to the victims of that armed conflict.1

Even as strong a critic of a broad reading of the Clause as the respected
international jurist Antonio Cassese was willing to accept "a further reason
for attaching some legal value to the clause: namely, the general principle
of construction whereby international instruments should not be
presumed to be devoid of any legal significance and practical scope." 132
Thanks to the Martens Clause, "if cases are not covered by the rules of
the Hague or Geneva Conventions, it does not necessarily follow that they
are unregulated, for they may be governed by customary rules-if such
rules exist with regard to a particular matter-or other treaties." 133
Ironically enough, this was the very position the United States advanced in
its submissions to the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear
Weapons Case.1 34
There is another hint to the continued vitality of the Martens Clause
(although it is only a hint) to be found in the different formulations of the
clause in Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions.
Although it is only a hint, a close examination of word choice in the
restyling of the Martens Clause in these two protocols suggests a shift
from the old view that international law had no application in contexts
purely internal to a sovereign state.
Additional Protocol I (AP I) concerns armed conflicts "in which
peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination . . . ."135 In that context, the Martens Clause, restyled in
Article 1(2), assures civilians and combatants that they "remain under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
131. Zimmermann, supra note 11, at 1341 ("If a case is 'not covered by the law in force', whether
this is because of a gap in the law or because the parties do not consider themselves to be bound by
common Article 3, or are not bound by Protocol II, this does not mean that anything is permitted.
'The human person remains under the protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of
the public conscience': this clarification prevents an a contrario interpretation. Since they reflect public
conscience, the principles of humanity actually constitute a universal reference point and apply
independently of the Protocol.").
132. Cassese, supra note 116, at 212.
133. Id. at 211.
134. Id. Cassese quotes the U.S. representative before the ICJ: "[The Clause] makes clear the
important protective role of the law of nations and clarifies that customary international law may
independently govern cases not explicitly addressed by the Conventions. This is what gives content
and meaning to the Martens Clause." Id. at 211 n.70.
135. Protocol I, supra note 100, art. 1.
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from established custom, from the principles of humanity, and from the
dictates of public conscience." Relatively little is changed from the original:
the reference to "civilized nations" is replaced with "custom" and
"authority" is substituted for "empire."
Additional Protocol II (AP II) adds to existing protections afforded by
Common Article 3 only in cases (1) that are not covered by Article 1 of
AP I and (2) that "take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol."1 36 The
Martens Clause restyled in its preamble makes no mention of "authority"
and no mention of "the principles of international law derived from
established custom." Why? The Commentary indicates only that this
shorter wording "takes into account the specific nature of noninternational armed conflicts." 137

What role does international law play when there is "protection"
without "authority," or, to use the original language of the Martens Clause,
"protection" without "empire"? The answer is suggested by this textual
distinction between AP I and AP II. AP I expressed the greater willingness
of the world community of states to broaden protections for fighters
organized against "colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination." 138
Those particular prior claims to sovereignty were more subject to criticism
than they had been in the past. And those who fought against colonial
powers were correspondingly less objectionable, or at least pragmatically
deemed to be potential future members of the community of sovereign
states, than in the past. If AP II "shall apply to all armed conflicts which
are not covered" by AP I, that is the universe of conflicts in which those
more acceptable contestations of claims to sovereignty are absent. No
claim of sovereignty (other than that of the only sovereign party to the
conflict) could be raised as a shield covering all of the fighters and civilians
affected by the conflict.

136. Protocol II, supra note 118, art. 1.
137. Zimmermann, supra note 11, at T 4433. The Commentary also suggests that the omission of
a reference to custom perhaps reflects an overly cautious view of state practice as insufficiently
developed-i.e., a bow to novelty. The Commentary states that "[in our opinion this cautious point
of view requires some clarification as there is more to it than that." Rather than fixate on the
newness of categorizing conflicts as internal or international, the Commentary notes that the
substance of practice may be considered to date back to the Lieber Code. Id. at $ 4435.
138. Protocol I, supra note 100, art. 1.
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That left only "protection," not "authority" (or "empire"). But
protection alone is enough in the late twentieth century because the
protection of internationally recognized individual rights exists today
without the need or requirement of support in the empire of sovereignty.
Individuals are, in respects relevant for the goals of the Martens Clause,
subjects of international law. States no longer have the sovereign power to
opt out of respect for them just as a state's assertion of support for them,
while certainly agreeable, is not necessary to their existence. What remains
are the obligations of all parties-state and non-state actors-that stem
not from authority/empire/sovereignty, but singularly from the protection
to which all individuals are held to be entitled under international law.
Consideration of emerging state practice demonstrates the conceptual
change in the relationship between individual rights and sovereignty.
Martens and his contemporaries believed in the absolute sovereignty of
states, a concept with no room for the claim that states were obligated to
protect certain individual rights. That is quite a different world than our
own, in which a position at the opposite extreme is sometimes heard:
precipitous claims of one state's responsibility to protect the inhabitants
of a different state from repression by that state's government.
A. IndividualRights and Sovereignty in Martens't Day
Why "protection without empire" should be the case in our own day,
but not in Marten's, may be explained by a thought experiment. When
Martens wrote his famous clause, he was representing a Russian state
besieged by transnational terrorists. Martens's participation in the 1899
Hague Peace Conferences coincided with increasing terroristic violence
claiming the lives of Russian ministers and civilians, not to mention the
uptick in similar anarchist violence in Europe and America. The Russian
response was as repressive as the Empire could muster. The Czar granted
no quarter to his transnational enemies and did not hesitate to use military
courts and summary executions to combat them. Did Martens think the
Martens Clause should constrain the will of the Czar?
Absolutely not. Martens had no interest in bringing the Russian
government's aggressive response to terrorism under public international
legal principles. Russia was free to use its military within the broad
confines of its empire unrestricted by any duties to conform that use to
any positive or customary international law.
Why wasn't the Martens Clause equally applicable both abroad and at
home? Martens might well have met such a suggestion with a look of bare
incredulity. His non-comprehension would be similar to that of Thomas
Jefferson writing about the uncivilized cruelty of British treatment of
American prisoners of war in the same letters in which he boasts of the
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scorched earth annihilation of entire settlements of American Indians.'3 9
To Martens and even the more liberal international lawyers of his era (as
with Jefferson before them), the legal regulation of military conflict was
limited to wars between civilized states.1 40 There was, of course, racism
present in the way some privileged (mainly European) civilization over the
barbarism perceived in others. But the crucial distinction that mattered at
least as much as the matter of civilization was the matter of sovereignty:
the war to be regulated must be between states. State action directed at
another state or its citizens might be subject to negotiation between (again,
civilized, mostly European) states. But within its own perceived borders,
the state knew no equal. There was no protection for a sovereign state's
nationals against force, even military force, directed inward. Within a
state's own borders, no law applied save that of the state itself.
Martens's theories of international law were complex but unbending.
On the one hand, he appeared to hold to the view, anomalous for his time,
that individuals were "subjects of rights in the domain of international
relations."141 In this philosophy of the source of international community
may be found Martens's belief in the power of international law to
establish a meaningful codification of the jus in bello: civilians and
belligerents, as human beings, were entitled to certain rights and obliged to
certain duties. On the other hand, this willingness of civilized states to
bind themselves by international treaties in no way legitimated, in his view,
any restriction of their own sovereignty, particularly the right to complete
dominion over their own territories; interference by one state in the
42
internal affairs of another state was "always illegal."1

139. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 35
(2012).
140. One such lawyer, an English barrister named John Westlake (who was involved in the
publication of the first international law journal, the Revue de droit internationalet de legislation compare),
"did not find it difficult to imagine that a colonizer might need to take 'punitive expeditions' in cases
of 'inroads or other outrages committed by savages of half civilised tribes."' KOSKENNIEMI, supra
note 87, at 86.
141. PUSTOGAROV, OUR MARTENS, supra note 10, at 76-77 ("All contemporary civilized (sic)
States are agreed that man is a person, that is, a subject of certain inalienable rights which must be
respected in the domain of their mutual relations. Therefore every person, irrespective of citizenship
or nationality, presently finds protection of his person and ownership throughout the entire space of
the operation of international law. The ultimate purpose of the State and the purpose of
international relations is the protection of the person.").
142. Id. at 67. Eyffinger points to an important caveat to Martens's commitment to the
inviolability of sovereign borders: "[Tlhe State's autonomy and territoriality he deemed sacrosanct
and military intervention he held for unacceptable, within the brotherhood of 'civilised nations' that
is: the interference with the domestic affairs of barbaric realms, for instance with a view to
forestalling the persecution of Christians, he deemed perfectly legitimate." Eyffinger, The Fourth
Friedncb Martens Memorial Lecture, supra note 13, at 21.
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When it came to applying these principles to issues that mattered to
him, Martens tended to the conventional view of the state's absolute
sovereignty. Thus, Martens opposed the Russian Empire's refusal to
recognize any right of expatriation for Russian subjects (a policy contrary
to the practices of many states at that time).1 43 But Martens supported the
Russian policy, another distinctly minority position, of insisting upon the
extradition to Russia of subjects (since they remained Russian subjects)
accused of political crimes. 144 Why, Martens asked, should political asylum
be granted to those "who call themselves socialists, anarchists, and
'dynamiters' and who have declared war to the death against any
Government?"1 45
As Martti Koskenniemi notes, Martens argued the same point at the
Institut de Droit international, "in a somewhat circular way," that such
people were not "real" political refugees, but mere criminals possessed of
the "instincts bestiaux de l'homme."146 The leadership of the Institut
agreed with Martens in at least one respect, again summarized by
Koskenniemi: "anarchism and communism were crimes against all States,
to be combated by all available means." 147 (Here it should be noted that
"European popular opinion, and also many individual members of
Western official circles, tended to regard the Russian comrades as freedom
fighters, justified in principle [if misguided in tactics] in their struggle
against the despotic and semibarbaric regime in their motherland.")1 48
Thus, in arguing for his eponymous clause and the larger work of
codification of which it was a part, Martens worked within a conception
of the absolute sovereignty of states. The Hague Convention could only
affect the behavior of state signatories when they engaged in "war" in the
sense understood by international law at that time: that is, war was an
interstate-and only interstate-armed conflict. Martens asked states to
establish a "mutual insurance association against the abuse of force in time
of war." 149 Comparing this form of organization to that of a private
insurance company, he narrowly restricted the benefits obtained to those
who agreed to the terms of the policy and the by-laws of the company:

143. Lauri Miilksoo, F.E Martens and His Time: When Russia Was an Integral Part of the European
Tradition of InternationalLaw, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 811, 823 (2014) ("In the context of human rights,
Martens defended unconditionally, for example, the right of individual citizens to emigrate.").
144. PUSTOGAROV, OUR MARTENS, supra note 10, at 271-72.
145. Id. at 272.
146. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 87, at 68.
147. Id. at 69. Koskenniemi notes "how easily the men of 1873 could fall back on repression in
order to defend their aristocratic liberalism" and situates this particular animosity within these
international lawyers' "manly determination to repress the spread of socialist ideas." Id. at 69-70, 77.
148. GE1FMAN, supra note 51, at 38.
149. Rolin, supra note 113, at 139.
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Now, Gentlemen, one is free to join an association or not, but in
order that it may exist it must have by-laws. And in insurance
companies, for instance those against fire, hail, or other calamities,
the by-laws which provide for these disasters do not regulate, but
recognize the existing dangers. . . . It is for the Governments to

enter the society or not, to accept or reject the hand extended to
them. However, only the member will benefit by all the advantages
which will be offered by this society in times of war.150
These remarks were to oppose the view of General Sir John Ardagh, a
British delegate, who encouraged the Commission to settle for something
short of a formal treaty. The 1874 Declaration of Brussels, on which the
Commission based its codifying work, had not been adopted in treaty
form by states. In Ardagh's opinion, this was the preferred course: after
the Commission was done improving its language "we would better accept
the Declaration only as a general basis for instructions to our troops on
the laws and customs of war, without any pledge to accept all the articles
as voted by the majority."1 5 For Martens, international law inevitably led to
the conclusion that a formal treaty be adopted: "This is the only way of
obtaining an obligation binding on the signatory Powers. It is well
understood that the Declaration of Brussels will have no binding force
52
except for the contracting or acceding States."1
So there could be no question of applying his clause, let alone the rest
of the Hague Convention, to terrorists. When anarchists and fighters
sought refuge from (or plotted against) Russia abroad, Russia demanded
their extradition. To the extent that anarchists and nihilists operated within
Russia, the Empire had absolute sovereignty to choose any means by
which to deal with its own subjects.
Had the concept of sovereignty not been so rigidly accepted in the
relations between states, the Martens Clause may have had application in
the fight against these fin-de-sikde transnational terrorists. But sovereignty
remained a concept that seemed to brook no intermediate approach under
international law.1 53 A state was either sovereign or it was not. Consider the

150. EYFFINGER, supra note 47, at 300.
151. Rolin, supra note 113, at 138.
152. Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted).
153. Ticehurst, supra note 121, at 131 ("By the end of the nineteenth century, concepts of legal
positivism and State sovereignty had become dominant in international legal thinking.. . . Through a
positivist interpretation of international law, States which do not consent to being bound by treaty
norms or to the development of customary rules remain outside the regime governed by those
norms: subjugation to a positive norm is dependent on the will of the State. It is therefore
consensual law. If that will is absent, the State is not bound by that norm and so is not responsible to
the international community for non-observance of it.").
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reasoning of Martens's British contemporary, James Molony Spaight, at
the conclusion of his lengthy monograph on the laws of war after the
Hague Convention and the first Geneva Convention of 1906:
As I have said in the first chapter of this book there is no
machinery for compelling compliance with International Law.
International Law will never have a real "sanction," that is, it will
never be really "law" in the strict Austinian sense, unless and until
the various nations surrender some of their sovereign power to
one supreme ruler who shall have the right and the means to
execute his decrees. Such a "High King" - a revived Pope, for
instance, with a "ten-power standard" army and fleet and the right
to refrain the spirit of refractory princes, not by excommunicating
them, but by marching against them, smiting them hip and thigh,
and imprisoning them in the Vatican - would certainly dispense a
"law," but whether that law would then be International Law is
doubtful. For, practically, so far as foreign affairs were concerned,
the nations would not be independent and sovereign.154
Even a project such as envisioned (but never realized) under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter (especially the "special agreement or agreements"
of Article 43)-as near to a "High King" with "'ten-power standard' army
and fleet" as imaginable-would not result in real international law. Why?
Because such a power above states would render states something less than
absolutely sovereign over their foreign affairs.
What hope, then, for the introduction of the Martens Clause to govern
armed conflicts not of an international character, an even more sacrosanct
aspect of sovereignty than the conduct of a state's armies in the field?
None. Indeed, the report to the Conference as a whole of the codification
work done by the Second Commission on the Laws and Customs of War
on Land that Martens chaired made the following perfectly clear:
[N]one of the articles of the draft can be considered as entailing
on the part of adhering States the recognition of any right
whatever in derogation of the sovereign rights of each of them,
and that adhesion to the regulations will simply imply for each
State the acceptance of a set of legal rules restricting the exercise
of the power that it may through the fortune of war wield over
foreign territory or subjects.15 5

154. SPAIGHT, supra note 95, at 461.
155. Rolin, supra note 113, at 140.
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But this system was in flux. Take the so-called "temporary regulations"
imposed after the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881. These laws
(which turned out to be permanent-they lasted until the fall of the
Romanovs) were hated because they allowed for all sorts of summary,
arbitrary, and extreme arrests, detentions, trials, and punishments. But had
Russia-like most of Europe-not already begun to restrict absolutist
monarchies with constitutional reforms that infringed the discretion of the
sovereign, the promulgation of these Temporary Regulations would not
have been necessary in the first place. They were a retreat from a general
trend of restricting the sovereign's power. As Jonathan Daly observed,
Historically, absolutist governments did not adopt comprehensive
emergency legislation since their 'normal' laws were already
sufficiently arbitrary and severe. But as the power of European
monarchs began to be limited, whether voluntarily or under
duress, constitutional restraints instituted for the protection of
citizens occasionally hampered states' abilities to defend
themselves against forces threatening their very existence.
Prudence
then
dictated the temporary suspension of
constitutional restraints. Ironically, such suspensions were the
hallmarks of transitions from absolutist to constitutional rule,
from early modern Polizeistaat, or rationalized absolutism, to the
rule of law. 156
Sovereignty still retains its place. But it is not the same place that it once
was relative to the inherent right of individuals regardless of the state's
preferences for their treatment. That modern relationship is considered
next below.
B. Individual Rights and Sovereignty in Our Day
Fast-forward one hundred years from the transnational terrorism that
afflicted the Russian Empire. Imagine if the Martens Clause had been
drafted not in 1899 but in 1999. Though the text of the Clause would be
exactly the same, how would its meaning be understood in the context of
our own turn-of-the-century understanding of international law? That is a
very different context from the one EE Martens inhabited.157 This Article
156. Jonathan W Daly, On the Signicanceof Emergency 1egislation in

L

Impenal
Ve
Russia, 54 SLAVIC

REv. 602, 603 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
157. For a suggestion that Martens might have been less surprised by the diminishing importance
of sovereignty than suggested here, see Millksoo, supra note 143, at, 822 ("For instance, Martens
held-in the early 1880s-that the system of international law was no longer built on the absolute
sovereignty of states, but on the idea of an international community of which sovereign states were
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is not the place for a recitation of the creation and growth of the
international law of human rights. It is sufficient to note that "[t]hough it
has pre-war antecedents, the movement for the international protection of
human rights is largely a product of the Second World War and its
immediate aftermath."158
As we move through time from Martens's day to our own, we cease to
occupy spaces in which the international law of armed conflict placed no
constraints on the purely domestic actions of sovereign states. With the
introduction by treaty of the law of armed conflict into conflicts "not of
an international character" beginning in 1949, the Martens Clause gained
entree to domestic applications. This also opens the way for its application
in armed conflicts with non-state actors in ways that Martens and his
contemporaries would have had great difficulty imagining in 1899.
Terrorists still plague Europe. The Madrid train bombings of March 11,
2004, killed 191 and injured more than 1,800.159 The London public
transport bombings of July 7, 2005, killed 52 and injured 770.160 These
statistics don't include the attempts in London, Glasgow, and elsewhere
that did not succeed (much like the failed Greenwich Observatory attempt
that inspired Joseph Conrad). The ICRC takes the position that these and
other terrorist attacks, taken together, do not satisfy the criteria of
common organization or intensity sufficient to be categorized as an armed
conflict under international humanitarian law.161
Terrorism also continues to plague Russia. Terrorists, many originating
from Chechnya, have been responsible for a campaign of bombing
subways, apartment buildings, and public spaces that between 1998 and
2011 averaged more than 68 casualties every 6 months.1 62 But again, the
merely a part."). On the other hand, Martens "did not yet enlist individuals as full subjects of
international law, [although] he considered them to be part of the international community and as
having specific rights protected by it." Id. at 823 (internal citations omitted).
158. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE
GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION vii (2001).
159. Paul Hamilos, 21 Guilt, Seven Clearedover Madrid Train Bombings, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31,
2007), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/31 /spain.marktran.

160. 7Juy Bombings Overview, BBC NEWS (undated), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/londonblasts/whathappened/html.
161. It should be clear that this Section presents a hypothetical exercise. The ICRC has concluded
that, as a factual matter, such an assumption is not borne out by the facts. ICRC 30TH CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 28, at 725 ("In other words, can it be said that the bombings in Glasgow,
London, Madrid, Bali or Casablanca can be attributed to one and the same party to an armed conflict
as understood under IHL? Can it furthermore be claimed that the level of violence involved in each
of those places has reached that of an armed conflict? On both counts, it would appear not.").

162

.

Attacks in Moscow:

1996-2011,

CBC-RADIO

CANADA

NEWS.

(Jan.

24,

2011),

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/attacks-in-moscow-1 996-2011-1.1008425. A tabular summary of
these attacks brings home the scale of the terrorist threat. One is provided in the Appendix to this
Article.
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source of these attacks was not always the same, or even always known,
and sometimes highly controversial. 163 Nor does their intensity or
frequency match the rate of terrorism at the turn of the nineteenth
century. As noted above, terroristic violence averaged 18 casualties a day in
1907. Perhaps the only parallel is with the reluctance of diplomats in
Martens's day to accept the restraints of the law of armed conflict on the
sovereign's own internal use of force: the Russian Federation has never

allowed that the Chechen wars it fought in 1994-1996 and 1999-2009 fell
164
to be regulated under the law of armed conflict.
So, imagine the terrorist attacks of the 1890s and 1900s sourced to a
single non-state, well-organized, transnational terrorist group in the 2000s.
It is quite plausible that an armed conflict of a sufficiently sustained and
intense nature to meet the criteria of Common Article 3 could be said to
exist. 165 Of course, if the level of violence were deemed too sporadic, too
low a level of intensity to rise to an armed conflict, only domestic law
informed by international human rights law would apply to limit state
action under a law enforcement paradigm. It must be emphasized,

163. Some have alleged that the 1999 apartment bombings in Moscow and elsewhere in the
Russian Federation, in particular, were covert Russian operations intended to provoke the second
Chechen War.
164. Russia is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights and free to derogate
from certain of its provisions"[i]n time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation . . ." See European Council, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Sept. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5. It has not done so. See Isayeva v. Russia,

App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 791, 824 & 836 (2005).
165. Compare Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84bis-T, Judgment,

I¶ 392-399

(Int'l Crim.

Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2012) (finding an armed conflict triggering Common
Article 3 through the application of its Tadic factors to circumstances in Kosovo in 1998), with HCJ

769/02 Pub. Comm. against Torture in Israel v. Israel, 2006(2) PD 459, 475-76 [2006] (Isr.) (the
Supreme Court of Israel finding "a continuous state of armed conflict" to exist, citing "an unceasing,
continuous and murderous barrage of attacks, which are directed against Israelis wherever they are,
without any distinction between soldiers and civilians or between men, women and children. Within
the framework of the current terror barrage, more than 900 Israelis have been killed from September
2000 until the present, and thousands of other Israelis have been injured. Thousands of Palestinians
have also been killed and injured during this period."), and Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-

Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.98 doc. 6 rev

1153

(1997) ("The most

difficult problem regarding the application of Common Article 3 is not at the upper end of the
spectrum of domestic violence, but rather at the lower end. The line separating an especially violent
situation of internal disturbances from the "lowest" level Article 3 armed conflict may sometimes be
blurred and, thus, not easily determined. When faced with making such a determination, what is
required in the final analysis is a good faith and objective analysis of the facts in each particular
case."), and id at IT 154-156 (the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights finding that a 30hour clash between Argentine armed forces and attackers of La Tablada military base triggered
Common Article 3). See also Kenneth Watkin, Use of Force During Occupation: Im Enforcement and
Conduct of Hostilities, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 267, 312 n.279 (2012) (noting Algerian insurgent's
claim that bombs in crowded markets were elements of his warfare strategy, "I had my bombs
planted in the city because I didn't have the aircraft to transport them.").
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therefore, that although the fact of armed conflict is the trigger for the law
of armed conflict, what constitutes armed conflict remains quite
controversial and subject to debate.1 66 But let the assumption be that the
violence of such attacks would be intense and sustained enough to
constitute an armed conflict.
That would imply an armed conflict "not of an international character"
(a "NIAC") against a non-state actor. It is also possible that such a nonstate actor could obtain sufficient control over territory to establish the
predicates for the application of AP II to the conflict. In such a
circumstance, at the very least, customary international humanitarian law,
as well as domestic law (which itself must comply with international
human rights law) would govern the use of force, targetability, and
detention powers employed by the state.
If other states came to the aid of the sovereign afflicted by this nonstate actor's armed attacks, the armed conflict would remain a noninternational armed conflict. No new body of law would be added to the
mix. If states came to the aid of the heretofore unprivileged belligerents,
the armed conflict may become an international armed conflict under
Common Article 2 (an "IAC"). Much of the same customary international
law would apply, as would the treaty law governing international armed
conflicts, displacing as lex speialis the domestic law and, where applicable,
the international human rights law. 167
What has changed? How has the law of armed conflict-a specialized
body of public international law-expanded to restrict state action within
its own borders, or perhaps outside its borders when it engages in military
action against non-state enemies? In the past, a state's absolute
sovereignty-recognized as the core and concrete basis of the law of
nations-excluded the intrusive power of any other authority save that
imposed by overpowering force of arms. But today sovereignty is not
nearly as absolute. Consider, for example, the understanding of this
relationship expressed by the International and Operational Law
Department of the United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal
Center and School, the epicenter of training for America's military lawyers:
Under international law, sovereignty is the ultimate benefit of
statehood. Inherent to sovereignty is the notion that a State should
be free from outside interference. International law, however, seeks

166. See, e.g., GLORIA GAGGIOLI, REPORT OF THE EXPERT MEETING OF THE INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS ON THE USE OF FORCE IN ARMED CONFLICTS: INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGMS 1 (Nov. 2013).
167. It should be noted that the application of the concept of lex specialis is subject to debate
among scholars. For a helpful summary of different positions, see Watkin, supra note 165, at 301-14.
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to regulate State conduct. States "trade" aspects of sovereignty in
order to reap the benefits of the international legal system. While
this may seem natural in cases of warfare between states (or
international armed conflict), it becomes more contentious in
cases of internal or non-international armed conflict. 168
Seem natural? Not to Martens, diplomats, or many international law
scholars of his generation! State sovereignty has lost its absolute character.
The individual has ascended to a new status in international law. But
"more contentious" would hardly capture the view Martens might have
held of such a change. The inclusion of the mini-Convention of Common
Article 3, let alone AP II, was simply not within his conception of
international law.
The dilution of the plenary nature of state sovereignty is related to this
emergence of the individual as an international law subject and, in the
context of armed hostilities, to the recognition that war need not be
interstate to produce massive humanitarian suffering.1 69 The greatest sea
change in public international law has been the recognition that individual
human beings are not merely objects of international law, but subjects of
international law. Absolute sovereignty is incompatible with that notion.
Of course, "absolute sovereignty" was redundant to Martens's generation
of public international lawyers; it was impossible for sovereignty to be
anything else but absolute.
This is also both a cause and an effect of the erosion of the notion that
the law of armed conflict displaces all other law. In a world in which
humans have rights that are neither granted by states nor removable at
their whim, it follows that the law of armed conflict can only be a law that
is given priority in case of some conflicts with other laws, but has no more
absolute power than the concept of sovereignty could have. Consider, for
example, the commentary by Jean Pictet-as noted above, the "main
architect" of the Geneva Conventions-concerning the application of the
Geneva Convention IV concerning the protection of civilians when the
interest of states in doing so is at its lowpoint:

168. LAW OF AliED CONFLicT DESKBOOK, supra note 101, at 2.
169. Ticehurst, supra note 121, at 132 ("In contrast to positive law, natural law is universal,
binding all people and all States. It is therefore a non-consensual law based upon the notion of the
prevalence of right and justice. Natural law was to a great extent displaced by the rise of positivist
interpretations of international law ... However, the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which to
a great extent relied on natural law to determine the culpability of the Nazi high command,
confirmed the continuing validity of natural law as a basis for international law in the twentieth
century.").
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What would the position be, it may be wondered, if both the
Parties to an armed conflict were to deny the existence of a state
of war. Even in that event it would not appear that they could, by
tacit agreement, prevent the Conventions from applying. It must
not be forgotten that the Conventions have been drawn up first
and foremost to protect individuals, and not to serve State
interests. 170
As with an international armed conflict, so to with a conflict "not of an
international character." Pictet's Commentary to Common Article 3 notes
the distance traveled from the view of international law as the purview of
states alone, a law of self-imposed limitations that only states could make
and to which only states could be held accountable. In its explication of
the phrase "each Party" with which the article begins its description of
obligations, the Commentary notes:
The words "each Party" mark the great progress which the
passage of a few years had brought about in international law.
Until recently it would have been considered impossible in law for
an international Convention to bind a non-signatory Party - a
Party, moreover, which was not yet in existence and which need
not even represent a legal entity capable of undertaking
international obligations.1 7
The Commentary goes on to note that the guarantee of humane
treatment that the "mini-Convention" of Article 3 provides is absolute:
"No possible loophole is left; there can be no excuse, no attenuating
circumstances." 172
This change in international law was slow and recent. 73 Although the
Geneva Conventions were drafted "to safeguard the dignity of the human
person, in the profound conviction that imprescriptible and inviolable
rights are attached to it even when hostilities are at their height," the

170. Pictet, supra note 30, at 21.
171. Id. at 37.

172. Id. at 38.
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
(1987) ("International law, as used in this Restatement, consists of rules and principles of
general application dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with
their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or
juridical.'. That is a dramatic change from the previous Restatement in 1965. See id. § 101, reporter's
note 1 ("As compared with that [previous] definition, this section indicates that international law has
ceased to apply exclusively to state and international organizations and now deals also with their
relations with individuals and juridical persons."). See also id. § 906, cmt. a ("[Tmhe increasing
recognition of the rights of private person, whether natural or juridical, under international law, has
led to a variety of remedies and arrangements to protect these rights").
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treaties themselves did not clearly affirm the existence of "rights" per se
until 1949.174 As late as 1950, the U.S. Supreme Court noted (in a footnote,
since the matter must have seemed so clear) that there was no remedy for
individual grievances under the 1929 Geneva Conventions save the
intervention of state authorities on behalf of their nationals. 175 This
footnote was the basis of the holding of the D.C. Circuit in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, that the Geneva Conventions conferred no rights enforceable in
U.S.

courts.

176

Whatever

other reason

the Supreme

Court had

for

overruling this position, 7 7 reliance on a judicial opinion that reflects the
state of the relationship between sovereignty and human rights in 1950
(interpreting a 1929 treaty) does not correspond with the change that
relationship has undergone.
To reflect on this changed relationship is not to overlook tensions that
remain between individual rights and sovereignty. 78 Nor should support
for the arrival of individuals as rights-bearing subjects in international law
be misconstrued as a claim asserting sovereignty's dwindling importance.
79
Sovereignty remains a cornerstone concept of international law.
Nevertheless, the two concepts are not always in harmony. As the
Harvard historian David Armitage noted recently, "how to protect
universal human rights in a world of sovereign states, each of which
jealously guards itself from interference by outside authorities, remains

174. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIvE
TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 90-91 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960).

175. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950) ("We are not holding that these
prisoners have no right which the military authorities are bound to respect. The United States, by the
Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. 47 Stat. 2021, concluded with forty-six other countries,
including the German Reich, an agreement upon the treatment to be accorded captives. These
prisoners claim to be and are entitled to its protection. It is, however, the obvious scheme of the
Agreement that responsibility for observance and enforcement of these rights is upon political and
military authorities. Rights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only through protests and
intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign governments are
vindicated only by Presidential intervention.").
176. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33,39 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
177. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627.
178. Indeed, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S.Ct. 1002, 1002
(2010), Justice Thomas (joined by justice Scalia), argued in favor of providing "much-needed
guidance" on "whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing and judicially enforceable." It is
interesting to note that the United States District Court that sentenced him to prison for drug-related
offenses held that the Third Geneva Convention was self-executing and provided "a right of action
in a U.S. court for violation of its provisions," Id. at 1003, n.2, while the United States argued in the
court of appeals that "no court of appeals has held that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions
are judicially enforceable in any context." Id. at 1004.

179. U.N. Charter art. 2, TI 1, 4, 7; Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 1.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9)
(U.K. "self-help" violates respect for sovereignty); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against

Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 1.C.J. 14, Ill (June 27).
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one of the most pressing dilemmas of international politics."1 80 Debates
concerning humanitarian intervention in recognition of a "responsibility
to protect" (R2P) expose the stress fractures in that foundation that result
from the increasing respect for individual rights. 181 The R2P concept
supposes (in varying forms) either the legal obligation or simple
permissibility of one state's intrusion into another state's sovereign sphere
in order to protect the individual rights of foreign nationals oppressed by
that state. (A responsibility to protect a state's own nationals could be
restated as the existing right to self-defense.) Its clearest formulation was
made by Anthony D'Amato long before the term was coined: "If we take
human rights seriously, we cannot insulate a government's actions toward
its own citizens by an artificial sovereign boundary."1 82 R2P exposes the
tension developed by elevating individuals to the level of rights-bearing
subjects of international law: "sovereignty as responsibility" is an inversion
of the classical conception of "sovereignty as absolute autonomy."1 83
The Bush Administration's "global war on terror" model (described in
Part I) asserted LOAC authority to pursue non-state actors wherever they
roam. That approach paid minimal regard to state sovereignty, but not
necessarily because of increased concern for individual rights. It would
seem to be for the state party to the armed conflict with a non-state party
to decide for itself that another state is unwilling or unable to pursue its
non-state adversaries hiding or harbored there. Similarly, a coalition of
states might arrogate to themselves the determination that a third state is
unable or unwilling to protect the human rights of that third state's own
nationals, in that way accruing responsibility for the coalition to act.
But there the similarities end. A decision by that imagined coalition to
intrude on the sovereignty of that state in order to protect the third state's
nationals invites a response from the state suffering that incursion on its
sovereignty-the decision is an affront to the sovereign's assertion to be
the protector of its own people.
Thus, while sovereignty remains a still-essential concept of international
law, the erosion of the concept of absolute sovereignty results in a
180. David Armitage, The Dedarationof Independence: The Words HeardAround the World, WALL ST. J.,
July 5-6, 2014, at C1.
181. Hathaway, supra note 15, at 499, 502.
182. Anthony D'Amato, Nicaragua and InternationalLaw: The 'Academic" and the "Real," 79 ANM. J.
INT'LL. 657, 659 (1985).
183. Hathaway, supra note 15, at 538. Thus, the General Assembly could adopt without vote
Resolution 60/1 World Summit Outcome, which affirms support for traditional conceptions of
sovereignty in its fifth paragraph while asserting Chapter VII authority to intervene without the
consent of states perceived not to be satisfying their responsibilities to protect essential human rights.
See G.A. Res. 60/1,¶¶ 5 & 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
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Martens Clause that extends its principles much further than its drafter
could have imagined. This is an understanding of its importance that the
United States did not display in its aggressive response to the attacks of
September 11, 2001. The Bush Administration thought that its military
action within a non-consenting state as part of a "global war on terror"
rendered the individual rights of so-called unlawful combatants subject
neither to the "protection" of a state's law enforcement rights regime
(subject to international human rights law) or of the law of armed conflict
nor to the "empire" of sovereign protection of those within its borders.
This is a view that the Martens Clause should be read to forbid.

C. The Martens Clause andArmed Conflict
Step back now from the minutiae of particular armed conflicts at
specific historical moments to reflect on the continuing importance of the
Martens Clause. In doing so, a fundamental principle of social
organization should be noted. In the absence of war, the default rule in a
state of free citizens, self-governed by law, is one that prizes the liberty of
the individual: whatever has not been prohibited is permitted. 8 4 This way
of thinking encourages innovation, creativity, and human ingenuity in
society.
This philosophy of default permissiveness extends to interactions in the
society of states. Indeed, this principle has been viewed by many to be
central to the decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the famous case of The Lotus: outside of the prohibitions expressed by
international law, states are free to act as they will. 185
In wartime, however, such liberty is not always desirable, either at the
level of individual human fighters or at the level of those states or nonstate organizations that direct the fighting. The Martens Clause reverses
this presumption in peacetime civil affairs to reflect the special case of
military conduct in wartime. It rejects the view that, because a specific
practice or tactic or action is not prohibited, it is therefore permitted.
Quite the opposite, it reminds us that an exhaustive accounting of
inhumanity is impossible, and therefore a general rule must apply to limit
the ingenious human cruelty that occurs in armed conflicts. Even if no
specific provision might protect a particular group of belligerents or
suspected belligerents or innocent civilians, the Martens Clause reminds all
184. The realization of this principle, for example, was a turning point in the final years of the
Soviet Union. ARCHIE BROWN, THE GORBACHEv FACTOR 146 (1996).
185. Armin von Bogdandy & Markus Rau, The Lotus, in MAX PIANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
9
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), available at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10. 10 3/law:e-

pil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-cl62.
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that these groups "remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law. . . , the laws of humanity and the
requirements of the public conscience."
This is the perspective taken in the ICRC Commentaries to the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.1 86 And it appears to have
been the view held by Martens himself. Fighting for the inclusion of his
clause, Martens rhetorically asked the other delegates to consider the effect
of passing in silence over disputed questions: "This uncertainty, is it
advantageous to the weak? Does the weak become stronger because the
duties of the strong are not determined? Does the strong become stronger
because his rights are defined and, therefore, restricted?"' 87
The Bush Administration argued that the law of armed conflict
sanctioned its military action following the September 11th attacks but
imposed no limits on how to conduct that action, the Geneva Conventions
not directly speaking to the "transnational" conflict with "unlawful enemy
combatants" fighting for al-Qaeda. As the prosecution of the "war on
terror" demonstrated, an entitlement to use military force without
corresponding restrictions-a jus ad bellum without jus in bello-invited the
very abuses that the law of armed conflict seeks to diminish.
The Bush Administration justified this view in the perceived novelty of
the conflict with transnational terrorism. The Obama Administration has
also embraced, at the very least, an ambiguity about what aspects of the
law of armed conflict apply to its fight with transnational non-state actors
and how terms in that law (such as "imminence") might be applied. But
such a conflict is not novel. The real change, unacknowledged by both
presidential administrations, was what really mattered. That was the change
in the relationship between state and individual in international law. That
change makes more difficult the assertion that the law of armed conflict
authorizes the use of force without imposing duties on the state. And that
change makes the Martens Clause more applicable in the twenty-first
century than its drafter scarcely could have imagined.
Martens, an eloquent speaker, argued forcefully in the subcommission
he chaired that "the supreme object of our common efforts" should be to
draft "an act of education which is to enter in future into the program of

186. Zimmermann, supra note 11, at 155 ("There were two reasons why it was considered useful
to include this clause yet again in the Protocol. First, despite the considerable increase in the number
of subjects covered by the law of armed conflicts, and despite the detail of its codification, it is not
possible for any codification to be complete at any given moment; thus the Martens clause prevents
the assumption that anything which is not explicitly prohibited by the relevant treaties is therefore
permitted. Secondly, it should be seen as a dynamic factor proclaiming the applicability of the
principles mentioned regardless of subsequent developments of types of situation or technology.").
187. HULL, supra note 85, at 217.
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military instruction." 188 By this he meant to educate not only the
commanders in the field, and those who staffed military headquarters, but
those occupying positions of political leadership:
Our present task is to remind peoples of their duties, not only in
time of peace but also in time of war. Our mission has been well
defined from the very beginning of our common labors: we wish
to elaborate, in a spirit of concord, humanity, and justice, the
uniform bases for the instructions which the Governments will
pledge themselves to give to their armed land forces .... It is our

unanimous desire that the armies of the civilized nations be not
simply provided with the most murderous and perfected weapons,
but that they shall also be imbued with the notion of right, justice,
and humanity, binding even in invaded territory and even in regard
to the enemy.' 89
And if their work should end in failure? "Under these circumstances it
would be impossible to deny to belligerents an unlimited right to interpret
the laws of war to suit their fancy and convenience."19 0
Under the circumstances of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, state sovereignty was privileged above all other values as the
cornerstone of international law. Today, the evolution of non-international
armed conflicts takes place under circumstances in which the value (not to
mention the meaning) of state sovereignty is not nearly so absolute. The
principles behind the Martens Clause, recognized as customary
international law by the International Court of Justice in its advisory
opinion on the use of nuclear weapons, apply to regulate all armed
conflicts. The Martens Clause prohibits a state that elects to treat a
struggle with terrorists as an armed conflict from disavowing the
humanitarian protections of the law of armed conflict that must by force
of that factual circumstance apply.
CONCLUSION

One might conclude here by asking what point there is to insisting that
states respect the Martens Clause, even this minimalist interpretation.
Notwithstanding a provision that makes clear that the application of
Common Article 3 "shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the

188. EYFFINGER, spra note 47, at 298 (quoting speech of Martens, Jun. 6, 1899).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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conflict," 191 states have not been very willing to accept its application. 192
From the perspective of the non-state actor, is there much reason to
believe that a terrorist organization (whether of the classic, small-celled,
nineteenth-century revolutionary variety, more modern insurgent groups
whose tactics include terrorism, or even organizations such as Hamas or
Hezbollah that in some senses govern territory under their control) would
likely agree to be bound by international humanitarian law, an invitation to
do so in Common Article 3 notwithstanding? 193 This law expressly
prohibits the intentional attack of civilians, often the raison d'itre of the
terrorist organization itself. 194 Aside from prohibiting the terrorist's
preferred methods of warfare, compliance with the rules for combatant
status is a recipe for defeat for non-state actors. As Christopher
Greenwood noted with regard to British interpretation of the requirement
of a fixed distinctive sign (an element required by Article 4 of Geneva
Convention IV to claim prisoner of war status), "[i]t is difficult to imagine
any guerrilla movement being able to comply with this requirement and
survive."195 It is even more difficult to believe that a terrorist group would
want to comply at all: "[t seems impossible to expect that terrorists can
be bound by principles of humanity and public conscience. In contrast,
their objective is to spread fear by arbitrary attacks. This makes the
application of international humanitarian law as a whole-including the
Martens Clause-impossible."1 96
The true value of these obligations, as with any act of self-restraint, is
the salutary effect of compliance on the conduct of one's own state.
Pictet's commentary, again, says it best:
191. See Common Article 3, supra note 31.
192. William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of InternalArmed Conflict: The European Court of Human
Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR.J. INT'L L. 741, 756 (2005) ("[S]tates routinely reject the application of the
humanitarian law instruments to violence within their borders. In situations that objectively
constitute armed conflicts, the application of Common Article 3 is frequently rejected, the
application of Protocol 11 has been accepted by only a handful of states, and the application of
Protocol I to a conflict against a national liberation movement has never been acknowledged by the
state involved. States refuse to apply humanitarian law to internal armed conflicts for reasons that are
more political than legal.").
193. See generaly Provost, supra note 25. Common Article 3 concludes with a penultimate
statement that "The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention."
194. See, e.g., Protocol 1, supra note 100, at art. 51 ("The civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.").
195. Christopher Greenwood, InternationalHumanitarian Law (aIws of War): Retised Report for the
Centenial Commemoration of the First Hague Peace Conference 1899, in THE CENTENNIAL OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE: REPORTS & CONCLUSIONS (Frits Kalshoven, ed., 2000)
(describing passage in 1958 British Manual of Military Law unchanged from initial appearance
shortly after 1899 Hague Conference).
196. Heintze, supranote 130, at 433.
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If an insurgent party applies Article 3, so much the better for the
victims of the conflict. No one will complain. If it does not apply
it, it will prove that those who regard its actions as mere acts of
anarchy or brigandage are right. As for the dejure Government, the
effect on it of applying Article 3 cannot be in any way prejudicial;
for no Government can possibly claim that it is entitled to make use
of torture and other inhuman acts prohibited by the Convention,
as a means of combating its enemies.197
Pictet noted that Common Article 3 set a "compulsory minimum" for
conduct in an armed conflict. "At the same time," he wrote, its words are
also "an invitation to exceed that minimum."198 The Martens Clause rests
on the same essential idea. The law sets a minimum standard of conduct
from which neither states nor non-state actors may lawfully depart. At the
same time, it is an invitation to do better.

197. Pictet, supra note 30, at 37.
198. Id.
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APPENDIX

TerroristAttacks in Moscow, January 1, 1998 to January24, 2011
DATE

CASUALTIES

LOCATION

Jan. 1, 1998

Subway bombing

3 injured

Apr. 26, 1999

Intourist Hotel bombing

Approx. 11 injured

Aug. 31, 1999

1 killed; 40 injured

Sept. 9, 1999

Manezh Shopping Center
bombing
Apartment building bombing

94 killed; 249 injured

Sept. 13, 1999

Apartment building bombing

119 killed; 200 injured

Aug. 8, 2000

Subway bombing

13 killed, 90 injured

Feb. 5, 2001

Subway bombing

20 injured

Oct. 23-26, 2002

Dubrovka Theater attack

129 of 850 hostages killed

July 5, 2003

Music Festival bombing

16 killed, 60 injured

Dec. 9, 2003

National Hotel bombing

6 killed, 13 injured.

Feb. 6, 2004

Subway bombing

41 killed, 134 injured.

Aug. 24, 2004
Aug. 31, 2004

2 planes from
Airport
Subway bombing

Aug. 13, 2007

Moscow-Petersburg train

60 injured

Nov. 27, 2009

Moscow-Petersburg train

26 killed, 100 injured

Mar. 29, 2010

Subway bombing

40 killed, approx.

Domodedovo

90 killed
10 killed, 50 injured

100+

injured

Jan. 24, 2011

Domodedovo Airport bombing

36

killed,

approx.

180

(Jan.

2011),

injured
Source: CBC-Radio Canada News, Attacks in Moscow: 1996-2011
http://www.cbc.ca/nevs/world/attacks-in-moscow-1996-2011-1.1008425.
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